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THE PROTECTIVE SWEEP DOCTRINE:
PROTECTING ARRESTING OFFICERS
FROM ATTACK BY PERSONS
OTHER THAN THE
ARRESTEE
Paul A Joseph *
As a prosecutor, you are informed by the arresting officer in a pending
case that he went to defendant's house to execute an arrest warrant.' He
made the arrest in the front hall and then proceeded through each room of
the house. In the back bedroom, on a countertop in plain view,' he ob-
served cocaine. The defendant is then charged with its possession.' "No
good" you say, "the house walk-through was a search conducted without a
warrant and therefore is unreasonable under the fourth amendment.' The
* Associate Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University. B.A., Goddard College, 1973; J.D., University of California, Davis 1977; LL.M.,
Temple University, 1979. The author wishes to thank his research assistant Karen McGuire.
1. The protective sweep issue arises whenever an arrest is made inside premises. Since
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), a routine entry to arrest inside a private residence
cannot be made without an arrest warrant. Entry into the house of a party, other than the
person to be arrested, requires, in the absence of consent, a search warrant in addition to the
arrest warrant. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). Neither of these cases limit
the right to enter without a warrant in exigent circumstances, such as hot pursuit.
2. "Plain view" expresses the concept that what an officer observes from a place where
he is entitled to be is not a search. Thus, if during an arrest the officer observes contraband
in plain view on a counter, it may be legally seized. Permitting protective sweeps allows
officers to be in more areas of the premises lawfully, thus giving them more opportunities to
observe seizable items in plain view. The challenge to a protective sweep arises, as with
other search and seizure issues, in the course of defendant's attempt to suppress the items
seized. For the seizure to be upheld under the plain view doctrine, the item must be ob-
served from a place where the officer was entitled to be. An unlawful prior search cannot
provide legal justification for a seizure under the plain view doctrine. See generally Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion); Texas v. Brown, 51
U.S.L.W. 4361 (1983) (plurality opinion, all concurred in the judgment on plain view
grounds).
3. The particular facts given here are for illustrative purposes only.
4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
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cocaine will be suppressed."5
Do not be so sure. Under the emerging doctrine of "protective sweep,"
the search of the house might be upheld, and the evidence of the search
might be admitted at trial. Although the right to "sweep" premises has
been asserted in several different contexts, it is the purpose of this article to
examine only one, because it is the one in which the strongest claim of
need to search can be made. The issues arising in other sweep situations
are analogous but dissimilar enough to deserve separate treatment
elsewhere.
This article will introduce and examine the "protective sweep" doctrine,
under which police officers may have a right to conduct a limited search of
the premises6 in order to assure their safety after a lawful arrest. This
article will examine the possible and actual judicial interpretations of this
asserted right and will draw conclusions about the protective sweep
doctrine.
Absent a search warrant, a search is per se unreasonable unless it can be
shown to fall within one of the narrowly crafted exceptions to the warrant
requirement.7 A nonconsensual walk-through of an arrestee's house in or-
der to discover other persons not named in the arrest warrant is a search.8
Thus, if the concept of a protective sweep is to be upheld, it must be be-
cause the sweep was conducted under the authority of a search warrant or
because the sweep, though conducted without a search warrant, was an
approved exception to the search warrant requirement.
Obviously, a warrant to "sweep" premises can be obtained under the
same conditions and with the same requirements as any other search war-
rant. Those procedures are beyond the scope of this article. Rather, it is
the task of this article to examine whether a protective sweep can be con-
ducted absent a search warrant. If a protective sweep is to be upheld in the
absence of a search warrant, it must be on one of two grounds: (1) there is
a blanket right to conduct a protective sweep incident to every arrest inside
premises;9 or (2) although no blanket right to search exists, such a sweep is
justified on a case-by-case basis due to the exigent circumstances surround-
ing the particular arrest. Such a justification raises the additional question
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "[Nior shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6. This article will also treat the related asertion of a right to enter premises and con-
duct a protective sweep when the arrest is effectuated outside the premises.
7. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9. No Supreme Court case has held this.
[Vol. 33:95
Protective Sweep Doctrine
of what quantum of knowledge of possible danger to the officers (probable
cause,' 0 reasonable suspicion," or some other) is necessary before such a
sweep can be made.
This article will address whether the protective sweep doctrine author-
izes a search on a per se basis. It will examine the different approaches to
the protective sweep doctrine and discuss the approach that best maintains
the privacy values of the fourth amendment while simultaneously provid-
ing reasonable safety to officers making arrests.
I. A PER SE RULE APPROACH
A. Incident to a Lawful Arrest
A "protective sweep" is a limited search of premises, usually confined to
a "walk-through" and visual scan of the area within the view of the officer.
The sweep may sometimes extend to an examination of closed areas large
enough to hide a human being. It is justified by the need to ensure officer
safety in arrest situations by discovering persons other than the arrestee
who may be hiding on the premises and thus posing a threat to the arrest-
ing officers.' 2
The issue of the right to "sweep" premises in order to protect the safety
of arresting officers did not arise prior to 1969, the year the Supreme Court
decided Chimel v. California.13 Prior to Chimel, it was assumed that inci-
dent to a lawful arrest, officers could conduct a complete search of the
entire premises on which the arrest was made.14 Chimel v. Calfornia thor-
10. Probable cause is used because it is the level of knowledge required to obtain a
search warrant. When coupled with exigent circumstances, however, the warrant is
unnecessary.
11. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
12. A 1963 study of 110 police shootings reported that "51% of the 110 cases [56 cases]
occurred when the officers were attempting to arrest or interrogate persons in buildings." In
about 40% of the 56 cases, however, the circumstances involved an encounter with a barri-
caded suspect, a situation irrelevant to protective sweeps. Another 10% of the 56 cases in-
volved officers being shot when knocking at the door. This would also not be eliminated by
permitting protective sweeps since such sweeps must be based upon a prior lawful entry.
See Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. ClIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE Sci. 93, 94 (1963). The article noted that 19% of officer shootings were attributed
to "[f]ailure to search the suspects or rooms properly." Id. at 95. The article did not differ-
entiate between cases in which the officer was shot by the arrestee and those in which the
shooting was by another person.
13. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
14. Eg., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see also United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971). Harris refused to apply Chimel retroactively and upheld a
search of a bedroom adjoining the room in which the arrest was made on the basis of the
prior broader search incident doctrine.
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oughly reviewed the conflicting authority that wrestled with the permissi-
ble scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest,'- and attempted to set the
limits of the search incident doctrine.
In Chimel, three officers went to petitioner's house to execute an arrest
warrant. When they arrived at the petitioner's home, they found his wife 6
and a small child.' 7 About fifteen minutes later petitioner returned home,
and the warrant was executed. One officer then asked whether the officers
could search the house. When petitioner objected, the officer stated that
the arrest warrant authorized the search.'" The officers searched the
house, attic and garage. In some rooms they opened drawers and required
the petitioner's wife to move the contents of the drawers from side to
side.' 9 Although described by one of the officers as a "cursory search,""z
the search actually lasted longer than forty-five minutes.2 '
In striking down the search, the Supreme Court limited both the scope
and rationale of the search incident to a lawful arrest:
15. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (dictum);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
(dictum).
16. 395 U.S. at 753.
17. Record on Appeal at 202, Chimel, 395 U.S. at 752 (testimony of the officer).
18. 395 U.S. at 754.
19. Id.
20. Record on Appeal at 205, Chimel, 395 U.S. at 752.
21. 395 U.S. at 754. "The basic, direct search was made in the master bedroom and the
room commonly referred to as the sewing room." Record at 231.
[Wie went into what I would deem the adult bedroom or the master bedroom.
We asked Mrs. Chimel to open drawers, asked her to physically move contents of
the drawers from side to side so that we might view any items that would have
come from our burglary. She did this without hesitation. In the master bedroom
and the ... sewing room, which in turn is a bedroom we did-she did physically
uncover certain items in drawers, and as we would spot them, we would examine
them. We picked up items that we felt were similar or in fact the ones taken from
our job. We left many items at the residence which we could not identify on the
basis of a police report. The specific medals or tokens or specific individual coins
as to a particular exact location would be very hard at this time to relate. We
found an assortment of all items in the master bedroom area and again in the
bedroom that was referred to as the sewing room.
Id. at 204. "There was a brief observation into the child's room, a visual search in the front
room, a visual search in the kitchen into several cupboards in that area, a visual, cursory
search in the garage, which is attached to the residence." Id at 231-32.
Nothing in the child's room was seized. Id at 239. While in the garage Officer Del Coma
observed a small dental workshop (petitioner was a dental technician) and certain marked
plastic coin tubes which were not listed as missing or stolen. Id at 239. See also Respon-
dent's Brief at 18-19, Chimel, 395 U.S. at 752.
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When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect
his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endan-
gered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its conceal-
ment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of
course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of
the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate con-
trol"--construing that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs-
or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or
other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.22
On its face, the holding in Chimel could be read as preventing the recog-
nition of a rule that would uphold the right to conduct protective sweeps
routinely incident to lawful arrests. Normally, a protective sweep extends
to rooms beyond that in which the arrest took place and is clearly not
limited to the area from which the arrestee could procure a weapon or
destroy evidence.
Nevertheless, the rule in Chime? must be interpreted in light of its partic-
ular facts. Chimel did not involve a mere walk-through of the house.
Rather, it involved a seizure of objects from closed drawers.23 Further,
whatever the scope of the search in Chimel, it was not made for the pur-
pose of protecting the safety of the officers. The search was justified, at
every step of the proceedings, solely as a search for evidence of the crime.24
It can be argued that absent any assertion that the search was made to
protect the safety of the officers, no protective sweep issue was before the
Court. The holding in Chimel, therefore, should not be read asforeclosing
an examination of premises for the purpose of protecting the officers from
22. 395 U.S. at 763.
23. Id at 754.
24. "I advised him on the basis of a lawful arrest on a Felony warrant, which he had
just viewed, that I would like his wife to accompany me through the residence for a cursory
searchfor any possible evidence from our burglary." Record on Appeal at 202, Chimel, 395
U.S. at 752 (testimony of Officer Del Coma) (emphasis added).
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possible harm. In fact, the underlying rationale of the Chimel case may
lend some support to the protective sweep notion. Although the Supreme
Court in upholding the limited search incident doctrine recognized the
possibility that the arrestee might destroy evidence of the crime,25 Chimel
sharply limits the scope of searches for evidence incident to a lawful arrest.
Rather, Chimel indicates that the major reason for upholding such a search
is the Court's strong concern for the safety of the arresting officers.26 This
suggests a willingness on the part of the Court to consider a broader right
to search when it is conducted as a precaution for the safety of the arrest-
ing officers. In Chimel, of course, no such fear was alleged.
Whether a protective sweep of some dimension would be approved inci-
dent to a lawful arrest is neither foreclosed nor approved in Chimel.
Rather, it appears that the issue is still an open one after Chime. 27
Chimel supplied not only a rule but also a rationale for its decision. The
rule provides that a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the per-
son of the arrestee or an area that the arrestee could reasonably be ex-
pected to reach.28 This area is the zone of danger within which the
arrestee could procure a weapon or destroy evidence of the crime.29
Under the rationale of Chimel, where there is no evidence to destroy or
weapons to obtain, no search incident should be permitted. The rationale
of Chimel, therefore, does not support a blanket right to sweep premises
incident to an arrest. Rather the search incident doctrine would apply
only to cases where a need to search can be demonstrated.
Nevertheless Chimel's doctrine has been extended. In United States v.
Robinson,3° the Supreme Court converted the search incident doctrine into
a per se rule permitting searches within the limits set by Chimel. If inci-
dent to a lawful arrest, the search is permissible whether or not weapons or
evidence reasonably could be expected to be found.
In Robinson, the petitioner was arrested for driving without a valid oper-
ator's permit,3' a crime for which, by definition, no tangible evidence ex-
ists. After the arrest, the officer searched the arrestee. The officer felt
something in a pocket, removed it, and found a cigarette package which
was "crumpled up". 32 Although it is implausible that the cigarette pack-
25. 395 U.S. at 763.
26. Id.
27. Id
28. Id The Court thus narrowed the scope of the area considered to be within the
immediate control of the arrestee.
29. Id.
30. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
31. Id at 220.
32. Id at 223.
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age contained a weapon, the officer opened the package and discovered
heroin inside.33
In upholding the search, the Court rejected the invitation of the court of
appeals to employ a Terry v. Ohio rationale to limit the scope of the search
incident doctrine. The Court noted the difference between a full arrest and
a stop under Terry, and concluded that even the absence of any evidence
of the crime did not change a search incident to a lawful arrest, to a Terry
frisk for weapons.34
The court rejected any notion that a search of the arrestee incident to
arrest required a showing that the circumstances underlying the Chimel
rationale for a search were present. Rather, the Court declared the search
of the arrestee incident to a lawful arrest to be per se reasonable.35
Because the risks to the officer in any arrest situation are high, all arrests
may be treated alike in measuring the permissible scope of a search inci-
dent to those arrests. The Court in Robinson adopted this reasoning.36
The Robinson and Chimel cases, taken together, indicate that a concern
33. Id In fact, the testimony from the original hearing on the motion to suppress the
heroin indicated that it was departmental policy to open and examine any and all items
seized from an arrestee during a search incident to a lawful arrest, whether or not the item
was a weapon. By contrast, if the person was not under arrest and only a pat down or frisk
was being conducted (under the authority of Terry v. Ohio) an item which was clearly not a
weapon would not be examined. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221 n.2.
34. Id at 234. See infra notes 172-179 and accompanying text.
35. But quite apart from these distinctions, our more fundamental disagreement
with the Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion that there must be litigated in
each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons support-
ing the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest. . . The
authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based
upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a
Court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that
weapons or evidence.would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A
custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification.
Id at 235.
36. Nor are we inclined, on the basis of what seems to us to be a rather speculative
judgment, to qualify the breadth of the general authority to search incident to a
lawful custodial arrest on an assumption that persons arrested for the offense of
driving while their licenses have been revoked are less likely to possess dangerous
weapons than are those arrested for other crimes. It is scarcely open to doubt that
the danger to an officer is far greater in the case of the extended exposure which
follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police
station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical
Terry-type stop. This is an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alikefor
purposes of search just#cation.
Id at 234-35 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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for an officer's safety as he makes a lawful custodial arrest justifies a nar-
rowly defined search.37 It is unclear from those cases alone, however,
whether such a search on a per se basis extends beyond the person of the
arrestee. Even if it does, the scope authorized by Robinson could not ex-
tend beyond that authorized in Chimel.
B. Security of Premises
Another justification for upholding a protective sweep on a per se basis
is emerging. Courts may begin to recognize an officer's right to secure
premises while executing an arrest warrant. This idea originates in the
analogous right, recognized in Michigan v. Summers, to secure premises
while executing a search warrant. 38
Summers involved the execution of a search warrant. Police officers ap-
proached the house and detained the defendant as he attempted to leave.
The officers then entered the house with defendant and detained eight
others found on the premises until the search was completed. The officers
found narcotics in the basement and, after confirming that the defendant
owned the house, arrested and searched him. Heroin was found in defend-
ant's coat pocket.39
The issue in Summers, then, was whether the initial seizure of the de-
fendant and his subsequent detention was reasonable.' Defendant was
not searched until after his arrest. That arrest was made with probable
cause discovered during the lawful prior search of the house. The initial
37. Robinson dealt with a search of the person only. It is unclear whether such a per se
rule would be acceptable if applied to the area under the arrestee's immediate control. The
Court noted in its opinion that the search of the person incident to a lawful arrest has had
wider and more uniform acceptance. Id at 224. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion,
justified the search of Robinson on the ground that a person once arrested, "retains no sig-
nificant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person." Id at 237 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Under the Powell rationale, the case would not lend support to the notion of a
per se search incident rule since it could not be said that a person once arrested retains no
privacy interest in his home.
Furthermore, even assuming a per se search incident rule extending beyond the body of
the arrestee, this case alone would not settle the issue of the legality of a blanket sweep of the
entire house. Because any extension beyond the area under the arrestee's immediate control
is a greater intrusion upon the arrestee's privacy rights, the intrusion must be weighed
against the legitimate state interest in officer safety. If permitted, the scope of any such
search must be carefully limited to preserve this balance.
38. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
39. Id. at 693. The defendant successfully moved to suppress the heroin as the product
of an illegal search. The trial court's decision was upheld on appeal. The state's subsequent
motion for certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. Id at 694.
40. "The dispositive question in this case is whether the initial detention of respondent
violated his constitutional right to be secure against an unreasonable seizure of his person."
Id
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detention was a seizure without probable cause and, under the fourth
amendment, unreasonable.41The Court, however, noted that there were
exceptions to the general rule. When the level of intrusion into a citizen's
privacy is substantially less than that involved in an arrest or similar
seizure, and where the need to make the intrusion is based on an important
state interest, the Court, in the past, has upheld such intrusions as reason-
able under the fourth amendment.42 The limited street stop of a suspicious
person for questioning, approved in Terry v. Ohio,4 is an example of one
such exception.
In analyzing the intrusion in Summers, Justice Stevens noted that the
seizure of the defendant occurred only after the police had obtained a war-
rant to search the house. The Court stated that "[t]he detention of one of
the residents while the premises were searched, although admittedly a sig-
nificant restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search
itself."44
Is it fair to ask why this matters? If two fourth amendment seizures are
separate and unconnected with each other, the fact that one is judicially
approved does not legalize the other that has not been approved. The fact
that a warrant was issued does not give police a carte blanche to make
other lesser intrusions. Thus, it seems crucial to the analysis that the two
intrusions, the search of the house and seizure of its owner were closely
connected. Analytically, the lesser intrusion, the detention of the defend-
ant, was incident to the greater judicially authorized intrusion, the search
of defendant's house.
This initial point closely parallels the protective sweep situation. The
doctrine is raised incident to an arrest of defendant upon private premises.
As a result of recent Supreme Court decisions, no entry to make such an
arrest is constitutional without an arrest warrant absent exigent circum-
stances.4 5 It is the warrant which "authorized a substantial invasion of the
41. Id at 694-95. The Court noted that generally even seizures not tantamount to for-
mal arrests require probable cause. Id at 694 n.2. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200
(1979), for example, defendant was taken into custody for interrogation and transported to
the station (although not formally arrested). The Court refused to uphold the actions that
were taken in the absence of probable cause.
42. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 200, is an example of a seizure which did not
involve a formal arrest, but was as intrusive as such an arrest and so could not be justified on
less than probable cause.
43. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
44. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 at 693, 701 (citation omitted).
45. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (if the entry is made to third-party prem-
ises a search warrant will be required in addition to the arrest warrant). See Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
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privacy of the persons who resided there."46 "Physical entry of the home
is the chief evil against which the wording of the fourth amendment is
directed."47 As in Summers, it can be argued that the additional intrusion
of briefly checking and securing the premises and detaining those found is
a significant but lesser intrusion than that authorized by the arrest
warrant.48
There are differences between the two situations. In Summers, the
search warrant would have authorized the entry into all parts of the house.
Thus, permitting police to sweep the premises does not permit them to
enter any additional areas. The arrest warrant would support only an en-
try extensive enough to find the arrestee, which could vary from case to
case. It would not authorize police to enter other areas of the house once
the arrestee was in custody. Yet, not every search warrant authorizes the
search of the entire premises. If the Summers doctrine were applied to
allow police to detain occupants of the house in areas the police were not
authorized to search, then the gap between the protective sweep doctrine
and the Summers doctrine narrows dramatically.
Several reasons are offered for the decision in Summers. One reason,
the "safety of the officers," is identical to the justification for the protective
sweep:
46. 452 U.S. at 701.
47. Id. at 701 n.13 (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972)).
48. In United States v. Chapman, 549 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1977), police executing a
search warrant for marijuana in a house containing 10 people also seized all weapons found
during the search of the house. In upholding the action, Judge Edwards, writing for a di-
vided panel, analogized the conduct to a Terry "frisk" and declared it reasonable: "In a
search warrant raid on a portion of the Detroit drug scene, police officers have good reason
to secure any deadly weapons they may come upon until their authorized mission has been
accomplished." Id. at 1078.
The court explicitly cited the officer safety rationale while noting that any such search
absent probable cause had to be strictly limited. In Chapman, the search was no more exten-
sive than that authorized by the warrant. The seizures, although broader than those author-
ized by the warrant, were confined to impoundment of weapons found on the premises
during the course of the search. Under the circumstances, the seizures were reasonable to
ensure police safety. Id. at 1079.
In dissent, Judge McCree noted that the facts were not known with the specificity that
would permit a determination of reasonableness. There was
some indication that the premises had already been secured and that all occupants
of the house had been herded into two rooms where they were effectively under the
control of the police officers. If this is true, the second search which produced the
rifle cannot be justified as a protective measure.
Id. at 1080 (McCree, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Judge McCree would appear to be
correct. If the premises were secure then there was no need for the seizure, which appears to
go beyond the scope of the conduct later upheld in Summers.
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the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of
transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts
to conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the po-
lice and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exer-
cise unquestioned command of the situation.49
Significantly, the Court noted that no such danger to the officers existed in
the facts in Summers. °
Another reason the Court offered for its decision in Summers is that
when a warrant authorizes a search for contraband," there is probable
cause to believe that someone connected with the premises is committing a
crime. "The connection of an occupant to that home gives the police of-
ficer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion
of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant."52 This analysis
is not similarly applicable to the protective sweep situation because merely
occupying a house in which there is a person whom the police have prob-
able cause to arrest does not suggest any reason to suspect the other occu-
pants of crime.
To the extent that the Court based its decision on the suspicion that
anyone connected with the premises may be involved with the searched-
for contraband, the Summers rationale should logically apply only to per-
manent residents of the home. There would be little reason to believe that
casual visitors to the home, at the time the search warrant was executed,
were involved with crime. For example, the warrant may have been exe-
cuted during a dinner party with twenty guests. This interpretation, how-
ever, contradicts the rationale that officer safety authorizes officers to
"routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation."53 Such "un-
questioned command" can be had only if officers are authorized to locate
all persons on the premises no matter how great or how small their con-
nection with the premises. The police in Summers evidently detained eve-
ryone on the premises without stopping to determine the particular
relationship to the premises of each person in the house.54
49. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
50. No special danger to the police was suggested by the evidence in this record. Id. at
702. The Court noted, however, that there was a legitimate interest in preventing ffight by
the home's occupants in case incriminating evidence had been found during the search. Id
This reason is inapplicable to protective sweeps.
51. The Court left open the issue of the applicability of Summers to searches for mere
evidence. Id at 705 n.20.
52. Id. at 703.
53. Id
54. Id. at 693 n. 1. The case discussed the detention of home "occupants," not limited to
residents. Since only the home owner was eventually arrested, it could be argued that the
case only authorized the detention of the home owner. Yet the Court discussed the case as
19831
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One reasonable interpretation of Summers is that the concern for safety
of officers executing search warrants caused the Supreme Court to author-
ize detention of all persons present on the premises until the search war-
rant is executed and the search is completed, whether the facts indicate
actual danger to the officers or not. Similar concerns exist in cases where
police lawfully enter premises to execute arrest warrants. 5 This concern
underlies the protective sweep concept. 6
C Cases
There is only limited case authority in the federal courts of appeal that
supports, even indirectly, a recognition of the protective sweep doctrine on
a per se basis. 7 For example, in United States v. Vasquez,5 8 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that "one of the exceptions recog-
nized was the 'security check' or 'protective sweep' incident to a lawful
arrest."59 The court, relying on United States v. Agapito,6° indicated in
dicta that the sweep following an arrest was only a minimal intrusion.
Agapito analogized the protective sweep to the protective action, approved
as a de minimis intrusion in Pennsylvania v. Mimms.6 ' In Mimms, a mo-
one of the detention of home occupants and clearly seemed to authorize such detentions.
Therefore, any argument that the case is limited to a detention of home owners seems to be
an unreasonably narrow reading of the case.
55. In most cases the amount of time for which persons would be detained under the
protective sweep doctrine would be considerably less than under Summers since the arrest
and removal from the premises of the arrestee would generally take only a few minutes. A
search, by contrast, can take several hours.
56. The right to detain persons in order to "secure the premises" does not carry with it
any per se right to search persons who are detained. See generally Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85 (1979).
57. The Seventh Circuit declined to recognize the protective sweep doctrine as a sepa-
rate per se exception to the warrant requirement in United States v. Gamble, 473 F.2d 1274,
1276 (7th Cir. 1973). "We are thus invited to establish a new exception to the Fourth
Amendment requirement of a warrant. We decline to do so." The court then examined the
facts under a general reasonableness standard and found them insufficient to warrant the
search in question.
58. 638 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 975 (1981).
59. Id at 530 (citation omitted). While noting that the Supreme Court had yet to rule
on the issue, the court stated that it was in line with various Supreme Court dicta and the
officer safety rationale of Chimel. "Like reasoning justifies the minimal additional intrusion
of a quick check through the home to detect the presence of others who might attack the
arresting officer or destroy evidence." Id.
60. 620 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980).
61. 434 U.S. 106 (1977). The Mimms Court cited a study of 110 cases of police shoot-
ings. The study revealed that of those shootings, 32% "could be identified as occurring when
the officers were attempting to investigate, control, or pursue suspects who were in
automobiles." Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 93 (1963). This amounts to about 35 cases. Of those cases,
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torist was lawfully stopped by police on the highway, and was required to
exit the vehicle. This de minimis invasion would not be cognizable under
the fourth amendment and would therefore amount to a per se rule.
The statements in both Vasquez andAgapito are, in reality, dicta. Vas-
quez involved an arrest outside the premises. The entry and sweep of the
premises was not justified under a per se rule.62 Instead it was permitted
on the basis of exigent circumstances.63 InAgapito the arrest took place in
the lobby of a hotel. Officers then went to the arrestee's room, entered it,
conducted a security sweep and remained in the room for twenty-four
hours.' The court approved the concept of a protective sweep and called
it a modest intrusion.65 It struck down this particular sweep, however, for
two reasons: the arrest was made outside the room and no exigent circum-
stances justified the entry.66 There was no exigency because the officers
however, 7% involved shootings while in pursuit of the vehicle and in an additional 28%, the
officers were shot while still in their vehicles. In 22%, the shooting took place when the
officers approached the vehicle. In those cases, it is doubtful that officers would have re-
quired the suspect to leave the car as yet so the procedure approved in Mimms would not
have protected them. Only in the other 43% was the shooting after the first contact between
officer and suspect. This amounts to only about 14% of the total officer shooting cases ex-
amined in the study. Id
62. United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 531-32 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
975 (1981). The court of appeals correctly noted that the protective sweep doctrine is based
upon a prior lawful entry. Lacking such an entry "the government has an especially heavy
burden in justifying the 'breach of the entrance to an individual's home.'" Id at 532. Fur-
ther, the court acknowledged that the need for protection from persons inside the home is
usually much less when the arrest is made outside. Id
63. In Vasquez, the entry seemed to have been made to prevent destruction of evidence
in circumstances indicating that arrestee's confederates would quickly become aware of the
arrest. Id at 531-32.
64. United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 327-28 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
834 (1980).
65. The Agapito court stated:
The reasonableness of a security check is simple and straightforward. From the
standpoint of the individual, the intrusion on his privacy is slight; the search is
cursory in nature and is intended to uncover only "persons, not things." Once the
security check has been completed and the premises secured, no further search-be
it extended or limited-is permitted until a warrant is obtained. From the stand-
point of the public, its interest in a security check is weighty. The delay attendant
upon obtaining a warrant could enable accomplices lurking in another room to
destroy evidence. More important, the safety of the arresting officers or members
of the public may be jeopardized. Weighing the public interest against the modest
intrusion on the privacy of the individual, a security check conducted under the
circumstances stated above satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
Id at 336 (citations omitted).
66. Id at 336 n. 18. The court stated in the note that since the arrest took place outside
the premises, the entry could not be upheld unless the authorities had a reasonable belief
both that there were others on the premises and that those persons had become aware of the
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knew that the room was empty, having observed it for two days from an
67adjacent room. In most cases, however, officers have no knowledge of
who might or might not be in the house. If lack of such knowledge alone
would authorize a sweep, such sweeps would be permitted on a per se basis
in most cases. Nevertheless, the Agapito court was not willing to extend
such a rule to a situation where the police had actual knowledge that the
room was empty.68
United States v. Marszalkowski69 involved two different appeals in a
complex drug case.70 The case concerned the entry, with probable cause,7 1
of an apartment that was the center of a drug selling operation. The police
conducted a protective sweep and seized a number of items found in plain
view, including cocaine.72 The trial judge granted defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence obtained during the sweep.73
After holding that the entry itself was lawful," the Eleventh Circuit also
upheld the protective sweep on two grounds.75 First, the court indicated
arrest. In that situation they might escape, destroy evidence, or pose a threat to the officers.
Id. It is questionable, however, whether even this authorizes the entry absent an affirmative
reason to believe that those in the house actually posed such a threat.
67. Id at 336.
68. Such a limitation is not necessarily inconsistent with the per se approach to searches
incident to a lawful arrest in Robinson. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. It is
probably never possible to know with certainty that an arrested person will pose no danger
to the officer, but it is possible to know as in Agapito, that a room contains no people. Thus,
this author would view a rule which permitted protective sweeps incident to arrest absent
actual knowledge on the part of the arresting officer that the premises were empty as func-
tionally equivalent to a per se rule.
69. 669 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1982).
70. Moscowitz, a police informant, told DEA agents about a trafficker in drugs, Loran
Bennett. The agents and the informant arranged with Bennett to purchase some cocaine. At
an arranged meeting in a motel parking lot, Bennett and his companion, Mitchell, were
arrested. Bennett was persuaded to call his supplier, Brock, and tell him that the transaction
was completed and that the buyers wanted more. Bennett took the agents to an apartment
used by Brock. Two persons were observed carrying bags into the apartment. Agents
knocked on the front door but Brock came to the kitchen door instead. The agent covering
that entrance "fell in" and other agents rushed in after him. Brock was identified and ar-
rested. White powder was visible. A female companion, Marszalkowski, was also arrested.
A protective sweep of the apartment for other persons turned up a number of items in plain
view, including some cocaine. Some agents remained in the apartment while others ob-
tained and executed a search warrant. More drugs were found. Id. at 657-59.
71. The court refused to apply the case of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980),
retroactively, and upheld the warrantless entry as lawful under Eleventh Circuit case law at
the time it was conducted. Marszalkowski, 669 F.2d at 663-64.
72. Id. at 658.
73. Id at 659.
74. See supra note 71.
75. The trial court's suppression order was reversed. Marszalkowski, 669 F.2d at 665.
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that exigent circumstances existed to validate the sweep. An analogy was
drawn to another case, United States v. Gaultney,76 and an extensive quote
from Gaultney was included. The exigent circumstances, however,
amounted to little more than the fact that the apartment was being used to
sell drugs.77 The key to the protective sweep may be the court's statement
that "drug dealers are likely to be armed and dangerous."78 This second
ground cited by the court gave the officers "both the right and the obliga-
tion to secure the apartment by conducting a protective sweep."79 Al-
though decided on the basis of exigent circumstances, Marszalkowski
comes close to establishing a per se rule at least in drug trafficking cases
since the "exigent circumstances" listed will be present in almost any such
case.
80
Another case in which exigent circumstances may be a veil for a per se
rule is United States v. Looney.81 Officers arrived at the home of Joe
Looney with an arrest warrant for Ronald Frick, who was believed to be
there. Looney answered the door and denied that Frick was present. The
officers entered and found Frick hiding behind a bookshelf. The officers
arrested Frick, and to ensure their safety, conducted a protective sweep.
They found a submachine gun in plain view. Looney was determined to
be the owner and was arrested. 2
76. 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980). Fifth Circuit case
authority is binding on the Eleventh Circuit if decided before the creation of the Eleventh
Circuit. The effective date of the law creating the Eleventh Circuit was October 1, 1981.
Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 12, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980).
77. A close reading of the case suggests that most of the factors listed to establish the
exigency really related more to the entry than to the sweep. A factor given some prominence
was that Brock, the arrestee, expected his partners to return. They had already been ar-
rested, however, and their failure to arrive could have made Brock suspicious. This is really
an argument that the entry had to be made without delay. Once entry was made and Brock
arrested, that factor cannot be used to justify any additional intrusion of a protective sweep.
It seems, then, that the exigency argument was intended primarily to buttress the entry in
case the court's refusal to apply Payton retroactively was held by the Supreme Court to be in
error.
78. Marszalkowski, 669 F.2d at 665 (quoting Gaultney, 581 F.2d at 1147).
79. 669 F.2d at 665.
80. The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected the notion that the dangerous nature of drug
cases justifies protective sweeps on a per se basis. United States v. Hatcher, 680 F.2d 438
(6th Cir. 1982). Hatcher, involved a conviction based in part on evidence obtained during a
protective sweep. The district court had upheld the sweep "solely because 'the subject of
drugs is a dangerous one, dangerous for all of those persons involved in it, especially those
who are on the law enforcement side.'" Id at 444. The court of appeals feared such a basis
for upholding a sweep could too easily be expanded to many other categories of crime "and
would permit wholesale abrogation of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness require-
ment." Id
81. 481 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1973).
82. 1d.: at 32.
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The district court granted Looney's motion to suppress the gun because
the search went beyond the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest.
The court of appeals reversed, upholding the walk-through of the house as
a protective sweep.8 3 The court first distinguished Chimel for the reasons
discussed earlier in this article.84 Then it asserted that a house walk-
through for security purposes was not a search at all.85 Although the state-
ment was inaccurate," it is arguable that this reasoning establishes a per se
rule87 and upholds the protective sweep doctrine.88
83. Id at 32-34.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 12-37.
85. "Indeed, the agents were not engaged in a Fourth Amendment search at all."
Looney, 481 F.2d at 33.
86. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), determined that any intrusion into the
area of one's reasonable expectation of privacy is a search. There is no doubt that one has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in one's home. Even after arrest, this privacy expectation
is not extinguished. If it were, then the search of the home after arrest would not be a
search, but Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), plainly held that it was. Thus, the
statement in Looney that the officers were not engaged in a fourth amendment search must
be wrong. To say that conduct is a search is not the same as saying the conduct cannot be
legally done. Not all searches are prohibited by the fourth amendment, only unreasonable
searches. The result in Looney may be correct because the sweep was a reasonable search
under one of the theories suggested in this article, even though Looney's reasoning cannot be
supported.
87. The later case of United States v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 917 (1976), stated that in Looney there was "probable cause to believe that a serious
threat to safety was presented." 515 F.2d at 1031. The facts in Looney did not seem to
amount to probable cause.
88. The Looney court relied largely on United States v. Briddle, 436 F.2d 4 (8th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971), where the Court stated:
The distinguishing and controlling fact, as we view the case before us, is that the
shotgun was not discovered as a result of any search whatsoever. Rather, it was
discovered by being in plain view in the bedroom which Special Agent Hancock
entered in the exercise of his conceded right to conduct a quick and cursory view-
ing of the apartment area for the presence of other persons who might present a
security risk.
Id at7.
The reliance on Briddle, which was not confined to the Looney court, was misplaced. As
the Briddle court noted "Briddle does not question the right of the officers.., to conduct a
cursory search of the apartment for other persons as a security measure." Id (citation omit-
ted). The issue of the legality of protective sweeps was not before the court. Therefore, it
could not have been decided in that case. The quoted passage suggested that the right to
sweep was conceded by the defendant. Since the matter of the house walk-through was not
at issue, the court's statement that "the shotgun was not discovered as the result of any
search whatsoever," id, applied only to the issue of the object's plain view. The court did
not refer to the officer's movement in the house to the spot from which he detected the
evidence, which is a fourth amendment search.
The Briddle case is widely cited in support of the protective sweep doctrine. It is strange
that rules of law can flourish and grow when they get their start, at times, in such stoney and
inhospitable soil.
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Incidental support for a per se rule can be implied from cases in which
courts have upheld protective sweeps with little or no analysis. If courts
justified such sweeps on a case-by-case basis because of special factual
considerations, one would expect extensive analysis of those special factors
in support of the reasoning. United States v. Turbyfll"s9 illustrates this.
Two police officers went to Turbyfill's house to question him about a coun-
terfeiting operation. Another man, Billy Joe Church, admitted them.
Upon entering the house, the officers smelled marijuana and saw a quanti-
ty of marijuana in plain view. Upon hearing a noise in the basement, po-
lice searched for its source and found Turbyfill and additional
marijuana.90
In upholding the district court's denial of Turbyfill's motion to suppress,
the court of appeals stated that police had probable cause to believe a
crime was being committed by Church. The court upheld the officer's en-
try into the basement as a protective sweep.9 Although the court consid-
ered whether such a sweep was precluded because Church had not been
formally arrested,9" its analysis of the justification of the sweep was limited
to a conclusory statement that "[t]he seizure of the marijuana in the base-
ment was also justified. The officers had a right to conduct a quick and
cursory viewing of the residence."93
The point is not that the sweep was improper. On the particular facts of
the case the security check may well have been justifiable. The court made
no attempt, however, to justify the sweep on the particular circumstances
of the case or to explain a basic theory of the protective sweep doctrine.
Apparently the court thought that a simple statement authorizing the ac-
tion was sufficient.
The same approach (or lack thereof) can be observed in United States v.
Christophe,94 in which police obtained information that two men were op-
erating a narcotics business. The police maintained surveillance of one
suspect's house. Under the mistaken belief that the vehicle contained the
second suspect, a fugitive from justice, the police followed a car leaving the
house.9 5 Eventually, the officers stopped and searched the car and discov-
89. 525 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1975).
90. Id. at 58.
91. Id at 59.
92. The court held that the sweep was not precluded because there was probable cause
to arrest. "There is no reason in such a situation for requiring police officers to formally
arrest a suspect before checking the premises for other persons." Id
93. Id (citations omitted).
94. 470 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1972).
95. Id at 867.
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ered heroin. The occupants of the car were then arrested. 96 Police re-
turned to the home they had been observing and arrested the occupant,
Albert Pierro.97 In conjunction with the arrest, police conducted a sweep
of the premises in search of other persons. 98
Although the court spent considerable time analyzing the stop and
search of the car, the sweep of the house was summarily approved.
"[W]hen the agents first walked through the Pierro house at 2:00 a.m., they
were simply securing the premises after arresting Pierro. They were enti-
tled to conduct a cursory examination of the premises to see if anyone else
was present who might threaten their safety or destroy evidence."99 As in
Turbyfill, the sweep was upheld but neither analyzed nor explained.' °o
In yet another drug case, United States v. Weber,' Goewert agreed to
cooperate with the government by participating in an operation to manu-
facture drugs with three others, Weber, Heath, and Sullivan. °2 While
wearing a wire, Goewert went to a farmhouse to set up the drug labora-
tory. After Weber and Heath arrived, Goewert signaled the agents to close
in on the suspects. The authorities seized two men, presumably Weber
and Heath, as they exited through a basement door. The agents entered
96. Id at 868.
97. Id. Pierro's parents were also present. The officers "seated" them in the living
room.
98. Id. Police secured the home until a warrant to search the house was obtained. The
search was conducted and 39 pounds of heroin were discovered.
99. Id at 869. Although the court noted that no drugs were found until the later full
search, the holding that the protective sweep was legal foreclosed any need to examine
whether the later search was tainted by the earlier sweep.
100. In United States v. Cognato, 408 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Conn.), a'd without opinion, 539
F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 926 (1977). The
district court upheld a warrantless entry to arrest defendant based on his violent history, the
probable presence of a pistol in the house, the presence of defendant's girlfriend, and the
possibility that the arrest of another outside the house had been observed by those within.
The court also upheld a protective sweep of the premises conducted after defendant and his
girlfriend were arrested, and after the weapon was recovered in a search incident to the
lawful arrest. No analysis was offered to support the conclusion that the sweep was justified.
The court merely stated "[o]nce lawfully inside the apartment, the officers plainly had the
right to arrest Cognato, and, incident to that arrest, to seize his gun and money from his
person, and to inspect thepremises to be sure no one besides the girl waspresent." Id. at 1005
(emphasis added). It was unclear from this statement whether the judge erroneously be-
lieved that Chimel explicitly authorized such a sweep, whether the court was extending
Chimel without clearly stating this, whether a new protective sweep rule was being adopted
on a per se basis, or whether the court justified the sweep on the basis of particular facts in
the case. In any event, the lack of discussion of the real justification for the sweep is
troubling.
101. 518 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 907 (1976).
102. Id. at 988.
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and saw the lab.' °3
Although the primary issue in the case was entrapment,' °4 the court also
reviewed the defendant's objection to the warrantless entry and search of
the basement. The court rejected this objection in a passage which was
more cursory than the search at issue in the case. Pointing out that the
police had probable cause to make the arrest, the court stated "the officers
were justified in making a quick and cursory search of the basement in
order to ascertain whether any other individuals were hiding."'0 5 The va-
lidity of the sweep was upheld without discussion or analysis of the facts,
even though the facts seemed to suggest that the officers knew there was no
one else on the premises."°' Unless the sweep was upheld under a per se
rule, the absence of a more detailed analysis of the facts surrounding the
sweep is perplexing.
In the final example of this judicial trend, the government argued the
protective sweep doctrine as an alternative theory. In United States v.
Blake, °7 the police arrived to arrest one person, Vale, and saw a second
person, Blake, suspiciously handling a purse that the police suspected con-
cealed drugs. The police walked through the house and saw the purse in
plain view in the basement.
The court upheld the police action under the theory that the walk-
through was to determine whether there were other persons present.
"Once in the apartment [to arrest Vale], a quick and cursory viewing of the
apartment was permissible to check for other persons who might present a
security risk."' 08 Although the court stated that "Itihe Government's alter-
native justification for the search comported with the reasonableness re-
quirement of the fourth amendment, ' ' 09 it made no attempt to link the
103. Id at 989.
104. The court rejected this argument. Id. at 989-90.
105. Id at 990 (citations omitted).
106. Police officers knew about the farmhouse in advance and, presumably, watched it.
Of the four persons involved in the operation, one told Goewert he was going to Columbus,
two others had just been arrested, and the last was working with the government. Id at 988-
89.
107. 484 F.2d 50, 56-57 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949 (1974). The police first
argued that since defendant was not under arrest at the time, it was likely he would destroy
the evidence once the police left, thus triggering the exigency of destruction of evidence to
justify the search. The court agreed with this contention. Id at 53-56.
108. Id at 57 (footnote and citation omitted).
109. Id In United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908
(1976), Cepulonis was arrested outside his hotel room. After expressing concern about his
wife and child he was allowed to enter the room. The agents accompanied him and con-
ducted a protective sweep of the room. After upholding the entry as one with consent, the
court continued, "[ojnce entry had been accomplished, the agents' conduct within the room
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reasonableness to any specific facts or situations. Apparently, the Blake
court would uphold a routine or blanket right to sweep.
A final group of cases upheld protective sweeps without recognizing
them as belonging to a new and separate category. Rather, they were up-
held under the existing doctrine of search incident to a lawful arrest. As a
result, the doctrine has been altered and expanded."
In United States v. Jones,"' an agent posing as a busboy went to Nis-
bet's hotel room to execute a warrant for his arrest. When the door was
opened, the agent and others announced their true identity. After a strug-
gle, in which a gun was fired, the agents arrested Nisbet and Jones and
removed them from the room. During a subsequent protective sweep of
the hotel room, the agents discovered drugs.' 12
Citing Chimel v. CalforniaII3 and Warden v. Hayden,"I4 the court up-
held the protective sweep. In fact, it stated that the sweep was within the
bounds of the search approved in Chimel."5 This is hard to understand
because the sweep in Jones extended beyond the room in which the arrest
was clearly justified. They were entitled to assure themselves that no confederates were in
the room who might be armed and dangerous." Id at 244.
110. In United States v. Squella-Avendano, 447 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
985 (1971), the court also used Chimel to uphold a search. Agents, with probable cause,
raided a house to arrest those inside on drug charges. Due to the fast breaking nature of the
case there was no time to obtain an arrest warrant. After some officers announced their
presence, another officer looked through a window into the house and observed cocaine in
the kitchen. Id at 577. While acknowledging that the observation was a search, the court
upheld the action arguing that it amounted to a search incident to a lawful arrest, although
the search took place before the arrest. "Moreover, the agents knew that their surveillance
had been detected. In these circumstances it is certainly reasonable for the agents to survey
the apartment in an attempt to learn in advance whether the arrest would be dangerous and
forcefully resisted." Id at 583.
In the normal search incident case, the arrest has been made so the location of the arrestee
is known, and the search of the area under the arrestee's immediate control, authorized in
Chimel, can be determined with some precision. In a case such as this where the search
takes place first, how can it be said that the search is limited to the area within the control of
the arrestee when that person may well not be located anywhere near the area searched?
Although some such searches could be justified on the basis that officers were searchingfor
the arrestee in order to make the arrest, it would not be correct to justify such conduct under
the rationale of Chimel v. California. Thus, although the rationale is questionable, there
does exist a valid reason for the conduct. It must be noted that probable cause to arrest
existed prior to the observation through the window. In fact, the arrest was already in pro-
gress. If the observation had been used to obtain the probable cause to arrest, the arrest
would not have been constitutionally permissible.
111. 696 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2453 (1983).
112. 696 F.2d at 483.
113. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
114. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
115. 696 F.2d at 487.
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took place, an action specifically rejected in Chimel.116 Warden v. Hayden
dealt with a hot pursuit situation followed by a search for the fleeing de-
fendant,1' 7 and is therefore not applicable to the facts in Jones. Yet, the
Jones court flatly stated that, on the authority of those cases, "[t]he police
may search adjoining rooms to look for possibly dangerous persons. ' 18
Although the court also discussed the possible reasons that justified the
sweep in this particular case," 9 its interpretation of Supreme Court prece-
dent suggests that the court may have approved a per se sweep rule in
everything but name.
United States v. Clemons,' 20 also involved a hotel room arrest with prob-
able cause. After the arrest, the agents checked the bathroom and found
heroin in a waste basket. The Court held that the search was reasonable
under Chimel. "Nor do we find the search violative of the Chimel rule.
The bathroom was immediately adjacent to where Thomas and Clemons
were standing. The officers had every right to look inside it to see if other
persons might be within."'' 21
The search might have been reasonable under Chimel depending upon
where the arrestees were standing. The court did not elaborate beyond the
statement that they were "immediately adjacent" to it. Yet, under Chimel,
the purpose of the search would be to locate weapons or evidence which
the arrestees might reach. Nothing in Chimel extended this to the right,
found in Clemons, to search for other persons. 122
Finally, in United States v. Mulligan ,123 FBI agents arrested Christopher
under a warrant. They allowed him to go into the bedroom to dress but
ordered him to stay seated on the bed. Instead, he got up twice and moved
toward the closet. An agent did a protective sweep of the closet to check
for other persons.' 24 Feeling a lump in a garment bag he proceeded to
search it and found a large amount of cash.'12
The court upheld the search under Chimel, but its analysis undercuts the
Chimel reasoning. The court noted that one circuit held a distance of four
116. See supra note 22.
117. See generally Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
118. Chimel, 696 F.2d at 487.
119. The agents did not know who was in the room and since a gun had been fired,
police reasonably could have believed that anyone in the room would be hostile. Id
120. 503 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1974).
121. Id at 488 (citation to Chimel omitted).
122. Id
123. 488 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 930 (1974).
124. "Agent Robertson then drew his gun and brushed the cothing that was in the closet
aside to see if there was anybody hiding there." Id at 734.
125. Id
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feet to be beyond the area of immediate control. The court distinguished
this, however, on the grounds that the purpose of the search in the other
case 126 was to find evidence, while in Mulligan the purpose of the search
was to preserve officer safety.1 2
7
The flaw in this Chimel-based reasoning is that Chimel addresses
searches for evidence or weapons that could be reached by the defendant.
Thus, a search of the area within the defendant's immediate control is au-
thorized. 28 The area within the defendant's immediate control is a finite
area governed by such things as his reach and mobility. The area is the
same whether the search is for evidence or weapons. If the court is saying
that when the search is for evidence, the area searched was not within the
defendant's immediate control but was under his immediate control if the
search is for weapons, the distinction is illogical. If the search was for
other persons, it is not authorized by the Chimel case.
129
D. Per se Rule Considerations
Although officer safety in arrest situations might increase if police are
authorized to sweep premises, this justification alone should not authorize
such conduct. Actions such as spot checks of citizens' homes or random
searches of cars might also make police safer and more secure and yet are
still prohibited by the fourth amendment. 31
The fourth amendment stands as a limit on governmental activity (even
some activity which is undertaken for beneficial purposes). It represents a
constitutional validation of the important interest in individual privacy.
More specifically, the fourth amendment recognizes the right to be secure
from governmental intrusions into the privacy of one's person, house, pa-
126. United States v. Shye, 473 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1973), aft'd, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir.
1974).
127. The complete discussion of the issue was:
In United States v. Shye, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's suppres-
sion of a bag of money found in a 'closet-type depression' next to a water heater in
an apartment in which the four defendants were arrested. 473 F.2d at 1063. Al-
though the bag of money was only four feet from one of the defendants, the court
held that the area from which the bag was seized was not within the defendant's
'immediate control,' as defined in Chimel. Shye is easily distinguishable from the
present case. In Shye, as in Mapp, the only purpose of the search was to seize
evidence. The search here was to protect the agents from possible harm. The latter
type of search is expressly condoned by Chimel; the former is expressly forbidden
without a search warrant.
488 F.2d at 735.
128. For a complete discussion of Chimel, see supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
-130. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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pers, and effects. 131 Privacy interests are continually balanced against gov-
ernmental interests, rendering only unreasonable searches and seizures
unconstitutional. The courts, therefore, must consider which intrusions
are reasonable under the fourth amendment. It should be clear that the
greater the need to intrude the more likely it is that the intrusion will be
deemed to be reasonable. By the same token, the greater the intrusion, the
greater the need must be to justify it. Viewed in this light, it should be
apparent that declaring protective sweeps de minimis intrusions is not an
acceptable answer.
Such an approach was taken in Pennsylvania v. Mimms.'32 In Mimms,
police officers stopped a car to ticket the driver for an expired license plate.
The driver was ordered out of the car. When he exited the vehicle, an
officer observed a bulge in the driver's jacket. A frisk revealed a gun at the
driver's waist. The driver was then placed under arrest.'
33
The key issue in the case was whether it was unlawful to make the driver
leave the car, because observing the bulge and the subsequent frisk would
not otherwise have taken place. In its per curiam opinion upholding the
action, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there was no indication that
the driver was dangerous. It was the officer's practice to make all such
persons leave their cars.134 Yet, considering the danger to officers ap-
proaching cars lawfully stopped on the highway, the additional intrusion
of making those in the car get out was dismissed as "incremental"' 35 and
"de minimis."'
136
As the Court noted, the driver was asked to expose very little more of his
person than was already exposed. The police lawfully decided that the
driver should be briefly detained. The remaining question was whether he
should spend that period sitting in the driver's seat of his car or standing
alongside it.
Not only is the insistence of the police on the latter choice not a
'serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,' but it hardly
rises to the level of a 'petty indignity.' What is at most a mere
inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate
concerns for the officer's safety.'
37
One may wonder how much of a privacy expectation a driver of a car
131. Id See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
132. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
133. Id at 107.
134. Id at 109-10.
135. Id at 109.
136. Id at Ill.
137. Id. (citation omitted).
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can have when the police are viewing his exterior body only. Historically,
privacy expectations of those in cars are lower than those in houses;
1 38
observations are limited to the appearance of the driver.13 9 By contrast, a
protective sweep takes place in the home, the historic heart of fourth
amendment protection."4 Such a sweep significantly expands the area of
the home that is open to scrutiny and permits entry into areas that would
otherwise be off limits to police officers.
Although it is improper to characterize a protective sweep as de minimis
conduct, a protective sweep on a per se basis is not necessarily foreclosed.
The need for the sweep-the safety of officers when making a lawful arrest
inside a home or other premises-must be balanced against the significant
intrusion of that particular sweep.
This balancing has led to the validation in some cases of per se rights to
search regardless of the particular facts of the case under review.' 4 ' Yet,
courts should not be too quick to embrace such a per se solution to search
and seizure problems. It is a virtual certainty that a per se rule will be
applied in some specific cases where, considering the particular facts, there
is no need to search. Where a rule permits a search or seizure, its applica-
tion in a case not requiring the search appears to be unreasonable unless
there is a counterbalancing reason for justifying the adoption of a per se
rule. 142
A reason favoring per se protective sweeps might be that the danger
inherent in all arrest situations justifies a sweep. A corollary concern
might be that it is impossible to determine with any precision whether such
a search is necessary. It also might be suggested that some good would
follow from a per se rule that would not follow from a case-by-case ap-
proach. These possible advantages will be discussed after the alternatives
to a per se rule are considered.
Justifying a per se rule based solely on the danger existing in any arrest
is highly problematical. Although this danger is enough to permit a search
of the person in Robinson, it is unclear whether it is sufficient to justify a
per se search even of the area within the immediate control of the arrestee.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
139. Cf. United States v. Knotts, 51 U.S.L.W. 4232 (March 2, 1983).
140. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
141. See, e.g., supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Robinson
extension of Chimel.
142. In Robinson, the danger inherent in all arrests is cited in support of a per se right to
search the person of the arrestee following the arrest. A protective sweep, however, is a
more extensive search because it would permit officers to move throughout the premises. It
is less in depth, however, since it does not generally permit penetrations into closed
containers.
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Assuming that Robinson can be read as extending this far, it would be yet
another step toward approving protective sweeps. This author does not
suggest that the protective sweep doctrine can be justified solely on the
basis of the potential danger in any arrest.
The other justifications for the per se approach cannot be effectively
evaluated until alternatives to a per se approach are considered. A per se
rule is broader, and therefore more intrusive, than a rule that would permit
a protective sweep on a case-by-case basis. While a per se rule may be
permissible, it is, in general, not preferable. Thus, in balancing a per se
rule against a case-by-case approach, the latter is preferable because it is
less intrusive, unless there is some additional justification for the per se
approach.
II. CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH
A. Introduction
The second way to justify protective sweeps is on a case-by-case basis.
That is, while rejecting a per se rule permitting a protective sweep, it is
acknowledged that the particular facts of some situations justify con-
ducting such a sweep.
The burden of justifying a sweep is, of course, on the prosecution.
Courts may adopt one of two approaches to determine the legality of the
search. The first would be to take a "totality of the circumstances" ap-
proach to protective sweeps. That is, uphold a sweep when it is deemed to
be reasonable upon an examination of all facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the sweep, without articulating any specific standard against
which to judge this "reasonableness." The second approach would be to
adopt a specific level of need for a sweep against which the facts in each
particular case would be judged. The two most likely levels of need are
the reasonable suspicion standard upheld in Terry v. Ohio,"' and the
probable cause standard.'"
143. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
144. A "bare suspicion" standard, by which a sweep would be permitted whenever the
arresting authorities had a subjective belief that they were in danger could also be adopted.
Under this standard, the only issue would be the honesty of the officers in stating their
subjective state of mind. Essentially, this standard would become either a per se rule in all
but name if applied as stated, or would become one of the other standards if the court
looked beyond the subjective beliefs of the officers and considered the actual need to con-
duct the sweep. Therefore, the "bare suspicion" standard will not be separately discussed.
A "reasonable suspicion" standard requires more than a good faith subjective belief in the
need to sweep the premises. Rather, the officers must be able to point to specific and articul-
able facts that justify such a belief. The facts known do not, however, have to be clear
enough to rise to a level of probable cause.
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Beyond the question of the standard is the issue of what facts are neces-
sary to support the standard that justifies the sweep. For example, assume
that a court determines that Terry's reasonable suspicion standard is re-
quired before a protective sweep can be made. What exactly must the ar-
resting officers be reasonably suspicious about? Is it enough that they have
reason to believe that others are in the house? Suppose officers had reason
to believe that the arrestee's seven year-old son and aged grandmother
were in the house. Would this authorize a sweep of the house? The an-
swer should be "no," because the sweep doctrine is based on the rationale
that there is a need to sweep to protect the officers from others who may
harm them. Thus, officers would need reasonable suspicion both to be-
lieve others were on the premises and that those persons are likely to be
dangerous to the officers. If a court logically followed the case-by-case
approach, the analysis would always have to include two steps: the likeli-
hood of others on the premises and the likelihood that they would act to
harm the officers. Both elements would have to be met before the sweep
could be conducted.
The primary advantage of a case-by-case approach over a per se rule is
that reviewing courts will be able and willing to engage in close and de-
tailed analysis of the facts in each case to determine whether the sweep was
reasonable. With this as a guide, officers in the field will be able to deter-
mine in later arrest situations, whether they are authorized to conduct a
protective sweep."' This will result in fewer sweeps and a lower level of
145. Although beyond the scope of this article, the same basic approach should be evi-
dent in cases dealing with searches to prevent the destruction of evidence. Fourth amend-
ment reasonableness is a matter of balancing the interest of the government (the reason for
the instrusion) against the privacy interest of the citizen. Although discovering evidence of
crime (crime prevention) is an important interest, it is not as pressing as protecting the life of
the officer. Therefore, cases dealing with searches to prevent the destruction of evidence are
not directly relevant to the protective sweep issue under discussion here, because the interest
involved is not as compelling. A higher standard should be required for a sweep to discover
evidence than for one based on officer safety. Yet, there is at least a very rough analogy
between the two situations and it might be somewhat relevant to briefly consider Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
In Vale, officers with arrest warrants went to the place where Vale was known to be living.
While the officers watched, Vale came out in answer to a car horn. He then returned to the
house, then to the car again. Officers moved in and arrested him outside the premises. Id at
32. Believing that the actions by Vale indicated a drug sale, the officers decided to search
the house. They took Vale inside to the front room and conducted a protective sweep. At
about the same time Vale's mother and brother arrived at the house. A search of the house
then revealed narcotics in a back bedroom. Id at 33.
The Supreme Court struck down the search citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969), and rejecting the Louisiana Supreme Court's view that the search was lawful because
it was in the "immediate vicinity of the arrest." Vale, 399 U.S. at 33. The Louisiana court
had also noted that drugs are easily destroyed and that officers would not know who might
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intrusion into the privacy of the people.
This possible benefit must be tested, however, to determine whether it
actually exists. A sampling of cases utilizing a case-by-case approach must
be examined to determine whether the courts are able to articulate and
apply a clear standard; whether the analysis is as complete and detailed as
it should be to realistically test the need to sweep under that standard; and
whether the actual results in the cases allow officers to determine with a
reasonable degree of certainty when they may sweep and the extent of a
permitted sweep.
B. Totality of Circumstances
The fourth amendment condemns only "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. 146 Although a warrant for an arrest or search can be issued only
upon probable cause and generally a full search or an arrest without a
warrant requires the same standard to be met, searches and seizures less
intrusive have been upheld on less than probable cause.147 A popular ap-
proach to the protective sweep question in a case-by-case determination of
the reasonableness of the sweep is to examine all of the relevant facts sur-
rounding a situation. 148 An examination of several cases will serve to il-
have been inside the house to destroy them. The Supreme Court rejected this argument as
justification for a warrantless search for two reasons. First, the protective sweep made it
clear that no one was in the house. Second, the facts did not fit any of the narrowly defined
search warrant exceptions previously recognized. To meet the reasonableness standards, the
Court indicated that the officers would need to possess knowledge that the evidence was
actually in the process of being destroyed. Id. at 35 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966)). "We decline to hold that an arrest on the street can provide its own
'exigent circumstance' so as to justify a warrantless search of the arrestees' house." Vale, 399
U.S. at 35.
Because no evidence was discovered during the protective sweep and the Court's review
was limited to the search and seizure question, id at 31, it cannot be said that the case
represents any specific holding in reference to the protective sweep question. The Court did
suggest a very high standard for warrantless searches for evidence (an "actually in the pro-
cess of destruction" standard), but officer safety considerations are somewhat distinct. The
case indicates the Court's often stated preference for search warrants and the need to confine
exceptions closely.
Justice Black, with whom the Chief Justice joined, dissented, arguing that there was prob-
able cause to believe that narcotics were in the house. In addition, the dissent asserted that
the ignorance as to who might be in the house and the public arrest within view of the house
justified the entry (and, one would assume, the sweep). Finally, Justice Black argued that
the return of Vale's relatives made further search reasonable. Id. at 38-39 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
146. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
147. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
148. In another group of cases the sweep is upheld with little or no analysis. See supra
notes 57-129. These cases were examined earlier under the per se section. It was suggested
that such cases provide tangential or incidental support for the notion of a per se rule be-
1983]
Catholic University Law Review
lustrate the considerations involved.
In United States v. Baker,'49 police with probable cause arrested Baker
and Miranda without an arrest warrant outside Baker's home while the
two were transporting drugs from the house to a car. After the arrest, of-
ficers entered and conducted a search of the house. The scope of the
search was not detailed by the court but was labelled a "protective sweep."
The sole justification for the sweep was officer safety. '50 Without knowing
the actual scope of the search inside the house, the conduct of the officers
was more intrusive than in the classic sweep situation because the arrest
was not conducted inside the house. Thus, the sweep and the entry into
the premises must be justified in this case. In a normal sweep situation,
cause no basis for upholding the sweep is provided. This could indicate support or at least
sympathy for such a per se rule by at least some courts. It is also possible, however, that
such cases represent a case-by-case approach by the courts. Thus, in a particular case it
could be that a court believed, on the facts before it, that the sweep was reasonable but
merely chose not to include an analysis of the facts in relation to the sweep question. Thus,
many cases discussed in the previous section could also properly be included here.
An example of the difficulty in determining the approach a court may use to justify a
protective sweep can be seen in United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1976).
Guidry involved an investigation into counterfeiting. During the course of the investigation,
defendants became aware that secret service agents were present and the defendants started
a fire. Police entered with firefighters and found the money in a back room. Id. at 1221.
The court examined all the facts and upheld the entry, stating "[wle agree with the District
Judge that the totality of circumstances confronting the officers on the scene was such as to
indicate that efforts to destroy evidence were in progress and would be likely to be com-
pleted absent prompt action in entering the premises under surveillance." Id at 1223. A
subsequent protective sweep was justified on two grounds: evidence destruction and officer
safety. "Assuming the validity of the entry, the officers had a right first to secure the prem-
ises for their own protection, and secondly, to make sure that no one was engaged in de-
stroying evidence in any part of the house." Id (footnote omitted). The right to sweep was
stated by the court without separate factual justification of the officer safety issue. It could
be argued that the case either supports a per se approach or, more probably, that the facts of
the case indicated a need to search for the safety of the officers although those facts were not
specifically discussed. A discussion of the facts relating to the destruction of evidence, of
course, do not in themselves provide justification for the officer safety rationale since it can-
not be said that all acts to destroy evidence are also threatening to the physical safety of the
officers. Reason to believe that a college student was flushing marijuana down the toilet, for
example, would not support a protective sweep based on probable danger to the officer.
The problem with all cases which, even on a case-by-case basis, uphold protective sweeps
without discussion of the facts involved, is that such cases provide little guidance to officers
in the field as to when they can and cannot sweep. Neither is there a standard established
nor even an articulation of particular facts which reflect upon the officer safety issue. In
Guidry, the court primarily focused on the evidence destruction issue and the officer safety
rationale might well have been an afterthought. However, the same problem can be noted
in connection with all of the cases upholding protective sweeps on the basis of officer safety,
but not articulating either a standard for sweeps or discussing the particular facts which
justify one in a given case.
149. 577 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
150. Id at 1149-52 & n.12.
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entry into a home is justified to make the arrest. The sweep is a mere
extension of the area in which police are authorized to be anyway. In this
case, once the arrest was made outside the premises, there was no separate
need to enter the home. This entry intruded into an important sanctuary
of privacy. Thus, the need to make the sweep would have to be particu-
larly acute and the danger to officers even greater than in an ordinary
sweep situation. The analysis of the reasons for the entry and sweep
should be particularly painstaking.
In fact, the court upheld the entry and sweep in one long paragraph.
Only three factors were listed in upholding the conduct. First, it was noted
that Miranda had been seen in the house armed the day before. But at the
time the sweep was made, Miranda was already under arrest. Second, it
was explained that Miranda was known to be working with a confederate.
Of course, this could have been Baker, who was under arrest, or another
individual. In any event, there was no indication that this person was in
the house or that he was likely to attack the officers. Third, the police
expressed a fear that there could be an armed confederate in the house.
No further support was offered, however, and it appears to be no more
than a subjective "bare suspicion" on the part of the officers.
Under the totality of circumstances-general reasonableness approach,
officers were authorized to enter and search a private home. The state was
not required to show that others were actually in the house or that the
others were actually a threat to the officers. The state also was not re-
quired to demonstrate why the safest course would not have been merely
to remove the arrestees from the area. In fact, it can be argued that the
entry to make the sweep was more dangerous than leaving the scene of the
arrest.
In contrast, in United States v. Cooks, 5' the court of appeals affirmed
the district court's decision that a protective sweep violated the fourth
amendment. With reason to believe that drugs were being sold at a certain
house, officers went to the house to purchase drugs and then arrest those
involved. Two officers were allowed into the house by Calvin Cooks. De-
fendant Smith was standing inside the house and recognized one of the
"buyers" as a police officer. There was a short scuffle and three other of-
ficers entered the house. One officer conducted a'protective sweep. Don-
ald Cooks was discovered in the kitchen with marijuana and a gun on the
table. "'52 Calvin Cooks and Smith had also been armed when police
151. 493 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 996 (1975).
152. Id. at 669.
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entered. 15 3
The court held that even if the entry to "buy and bust" was assumed to
be valid, the protective sweep could not stand fourth amendment scru-
tiny."54 The search was plainly beyond that authorized in Chimel, and the
court rejected the suggestion that exigent circumstances in the case (that
two men encountered in the house were armed coupled with a possibility
that there could be others present) were sufficient to permit the sweep. 55
Comparing Cooks and Baker, it can be suggested that the weight of
need versus intrusion is, if anything, more apparent in Cooks. Cooks did
not involve an entry justified solely on protective grounds as in Baker.
Rather, in Cooks, officers were initially admitted to the house by those
inside. Thus, the level of intrusion of the total conduct was much less in
Cooks. In Cooks it was known that at least some persons involved in the
operation were armed. One of those involved actually scuffled with police.
The state suggested a "possibility" that others might be present, in essence
no more than a bare suspicion. In Baker it was known that one of those
arrested had been armed in the past and that another might be involved in
the crime and might possibly be in the house.
The need to search appears to be much greater in Cooks and the intru-
sion in Cooks was less than that in Baker. Yet, the sweep was upheld in
Baker and struck down in Cooks. 15 6 These results are difficult to justify
153. Id
154. Id at 671.
155. Id. at 672.
156. In the earlier case of United States v. Gamble, 473 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1973), a
citizen reported that he had been abducted at gun point by three people, taken to Gamble's
home, beaten and robbed. Id at 1275. Seven police officers, with an arrest warrant, went to
Gamble's home. The officers knocked and heard a rustling noise from behind the door, but
no one answered. Id The officers broke in to the house with their guns drawn, arrested
Gamble, who was coming out of the bedroom with a female companion, and conducted a
protective sweep. Id at 1275-76.
The court declined to adopt a per se rule upholding protective sweeps and found the facts
insufficient to uphold the sweep under a general reasonableness standard. Id at 1276-77.
This case illustrates the protective sweep problem well. Gamble's two associates were in
police custody, and there was no reason to believe that other confederates in the criminal
enterprise were present. Id at 1275. Similarly, rustling noises are normal sounds heard in
any occupied dwelling. On the other hand, those inside did not open the door when re-
quested to do so and the house was one police had often gone to in answer to reports of
weapons being fired. Id at 1277. An explosion had recently taken place there, there were
bullet holes in the walls, and the door was boarded up. Id
The court correctly noted that several of the circumstances listed were not exigent because
they were either known ahead of time (condition of the house), or some other factors were
inconsequential (rustling). Id. Yet, it can also be suggested that while there was not prob-
able cause which would have made it possible to obtain a search warrant, the officers were
entering a potentially violent situation. A protective sweep in this situation might well have
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and unlikely to give police officers any real guidance in determining when
and to what extent a sweep is permitted.
Other cases show this variance in analysis and result. In United States v.
Hobson,15' a revolutionary group engineered the escape of one of its mem-
bers, Ronald Beaty, from custody. During the escape a guard was killed.
The plan was devised by Beaty and the mother of defendant Hobson.
Later Hobson loaded weapons and drove Beaty to a "safe house," where
Hobson guarded him for almost a month and gave him weapons. Still
later, at another home, Newman gave Beaty more weapons and discussed
plans to shoot it out with police if capture seemed imminent.' 8
Eventually, Beaty was captured and told police of his experiences in-
cluding the part played by Newman. An arrest warrant subsequently was
issued for Newman and was executed at Newman's home.' 59 Although
Newman and at least one other person were seen in the house, no one
answered the door and officers had to break it down to enter. A protective
sweep was conducted.
In upholding the sweep, the court marshalled some very strong facts.
Others were known to be in the house. Although their identities were un-
known, it was likely that they were associates of Newman. The officers
knew from Beaty of the plans to resist violently. "In the present case, the
officers found two persons, in addition to Newman in the house. Weapons
were lying around in almost every room in plain view. It was entirely
proper to quickly search each room for additional persons and weap-
ons.''  The sweep in this case was clearly justified and the factors used
by the court to uphold it were directed both at the issue of others in the
house and at the likelihood of violent resistance from those people.'
61
Hobson is not the only case in which a court has engaged in detailed
consideration of factors under a general reasonableness standard. United
States v. Carter,162 involved a burglary of military weapons including M-
14 rifles from an army facility. 163 A drawing found nearby and slogans on
been the wisest course to take. Although the Seventh Circuit did not agree, it is probable
that courts in at least some other circuits would have upheld the sweep.
157. 519 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975).
158. Id at 768.
159. Id at 775.
160. Id at 776.
161. "Clearly, where the house is reputed to contain an arsenal of weapons and people
who know how to use them and have expressed an intent to do so, some protective measures
are in order." Id
162. 522 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
163. Id. at 670.
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the wall indicated that the theft was political in nature."6 Over a year
later FBI agents armed with an arrest warrant, went to the home of Peter-
son, one of the several persons believed to be involved. When Peterson
was arrested inside his house, an officer went to the attic because he feared
a sniper could be hiding there. He saw a pile of boxes and blankets in the
comer. Fearing that someone was there, the agent moved some shopping
bags to get to the area, and uncovered military equipment that was then
seized. 1
65
The court refused to uphold the search as a protective sweep, noting first
that the arrest took place long after the crime and that no information
known to the officers indicated that the accomplices were within the house
or even in the area at all. 166 Although the stolen weapons were still unre-
covered and warrants were outstanding for accomplices who had in the
past been involved in shootouts with the police, this evidence was not suffi-
cient absent some reason to believe that accomplices were in the house. '
67
It should be noted that the weapons were not found during a mere visual
scan of the attic. Rather, it was only after the officer actually moved arti-
cles that he found the arms. Thus, it is very likely that the evidence might
be suppressed even in a jurisdiction upholding the general notion of pro-
tective sweeps, because the conduct in Carter was more extensive and
more intrusive than the brief visual scan permitted by that doctrine.' 68
164. Id at 672.
165. Id
166. Id. at 674-75. In United States v. Hatcher, 680 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1982), officers
arrested Hatcher in his basement, and conducted a sweep search of the entire house. Co-
caine was discovered in the basement, but not in a place in plain view at the time or place of
the arrest. Id at 442-43. The district court upheld the sweep solely because the court con-
sidered crimes involving drugs dangerous. Id. at 444. The lower court found "no evidence
that Hatcher was a dangerous individual and no indication that any other persons were in
the house at the time of Hatcher's arrest." Id. The Sixth Circuit reversed, suggesting that
only a "reasonable belief by the officers that there may be other persons on the premises who
could pose a danger to the agents would support a sweep." Id. "[Oifficers must be able to
articulate justification for a warrantless search." Id
167. Carter, 522 F.2d at 675. "For a rule that permitted a warrantless residence-wide
search in any instance where an arresting officer hypothesized the presence of armed felons
and noticed a potential vantage for a sniper might very well abolish the Chimel doctrine for
all but plate glass houses." Id (footnote omitted).
168. The court upheld a protective sweep in United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999 (5th
Cir.), reh'g & reh'g en banc denied, 532 F.2d 1054 (1976), where officers attempting to execute
an arrest warrant on four persons were met with armed resistance from those within. The
altercation resulted in a firefight and the use of tear gas. A later sweep of the premises was
upheld on officer safety grounds, because of the need to locate other fugitives for whom the
officers had warrants, and to see whether anyone in the house was injured. Similarly, in
United States v. Young, 553 F.2d 1132 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977), defend-
ant surrendered following a shootout and was arrested outside. The Eighth Circuit upheld a
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The picture that emerges from a recounting of a number of "totality"
subsequent protective sweep, but defendant Young apparently failed to contest the entry, as
opposed to the sweep. Id at 1134.
In a few cases protective sweeps have been authorized due to special circumstances. In
United States v. Perez, 440 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ohio), affd without opinion, 571 F.2d 584 (6th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 998 (1978), although the house in question had been under
surveillance as a source of narcotics, the initial entry into the house was in response to a fire
call and the first "sweep" was "to determine the scope of the fire and to insure evacuation of
the building." Id at 286 (footnote omitted). During the fire investigation marijuana was
discovered and defendant was arrested. Shortly thereafter, high explosives were spotted in
the backyard in a bag similar in style to one officers had seen defendant carrying out of the
house earlier. Thus, a second search was upheld on the grounds that police had probable
cause to believe that high explosives were in and around a house in which there was or had
just been a fire. Similarly, in United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1978), officers
had probable cause to believe that dynamite, some of which had been used in various politi-
cally motivated bombings, was located in a particular residence. The danger of the explo-
sives supported the warrantless entry into the premises to secure them until the search
warrant arrived, particularly since those responsible for the bombings, having just alluded
police, were still at large.
By contrast, in United States v. Stoner, 487 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1973), where an arrest was
made outside of a motel, an entry and search of the room could not be upheld on the ground
that a particular armed fugitive might be in the room when there was no evidence that the
arrested person was involved with the fugitive in any way.
There was no evidence that Stoner, who purported to be James Clark, was in fact,
Bobby Clark, a friend of Bill Sides. This being the case, there was no reason for
believing that Bill Sides was in the motel room. They had no information that
Sides was an acquaintance of either Mr. and Mrs. Robert Stoner or Mr. and Mrs.
James Clark, and in fact there was no such relationship between them and Sides.
Id at 653.
In United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1980), an agent entered a house
without any warrant, but with consent of those inside, in order to purchase narcotics. Before
any drugs were seen or the deal complete, other officers forced their way into the house and
searched it. Aside from problems with the scope of the search (a brown paper bag with
drugs was seized from a closet), the preceding entry was itself a problem. In a typical sweep
situation, as has been noted, a prior lawful entry has taken place. Thus, the need to sweep is
balanced only against the level of intrusion of the sweep itself and not also against the
additional level of intrusion of the entry. More need should be shown if the entry itself must
be justified on protection grounds. Here, the Court examined the facts, but concluded that
no objective facts indicated any danger to the officer. Although nobody answered the door
when the officers knocked, nothing indicated that the officer was in trouble. The crime in-
volved was not a violent one and nothing indicated that anyone was armed. Id at 318.
Similarly, in United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974), where defendant was
arrested outside his home, the mere fact that he turned and yelled "it's the police" toward
the house did not give officers the right to enter the house to conduct a protective sweep,
even though defendant had carried weapons in the past and the shout made it obvious that
others were in the house. Id at 789. Not only is entry into a home more intrusive than
merely sweeping a home already lawfully entered (thus requiring a stronger showing of
danger before such an entry could be permitted), in most cases it will be safer for the officers
merely to leave the area with the arrestee than to thrust themselves into a home unnecessa-
rily. United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1981), officers went to defendant's
room to question him. Upon entering, the officers immediately conducted a protective
sweep which produced evidence leading to defendant's arrest. Although precluded from
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cases is one of disparity in result and of scanty and incomplete analysis. In
these cases, the treatment of sweep questions generally is limited to one or
two paragraphs. Similarly, the cases failed to discuss the evidence neces-
sary to support a sweep-the presence of others and the danger to police
officers. Interestingly, the opinions striking down sweeps included a more
detailed examination of the facts. It also seems that courts demonstrated
more of a willingness to grapple with facts in cases involving more than a
cursory safety scan or where the prior entry was not based upon an arrest
warrant. 
169
arguing the protective sweep issue because the government initially admitted that the sweep
was unlawful, the court noted that no protective sweep could be authorized in such a situa-
tion. This is correct. The sweep itself is premised upon an initial "right" to intrude upon the
premises to arrest. Without such an initial "right" there is no basis for a "right" to search
the premises. There is, of course, no right for police to enter any home or hotel room just
because there is a person within whom police would like to question.
169. In United States v. Kinney, 638 F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1981), Workman robbed a bank
and Kinney was spotted just outside the bank at the same time. Agents went to the home of
Kinney's mother. When Kinney arrived, he admitted only that he had been near the bank.
He did know the robber, however, and showed police where he lived. Later, Workman was
arrested. Workman told them that Kinney had played a part after the robbery and a war-
rant for Kinney's arrest was obtained. Officers went to the home of Kinney's girlfriend,
where Kinny was known to live, and staked out the house. When a man was seen leaving in
Kinney's car, the car was stopped. The man said that the apartment was empty and Kinney
was at work. Officers (eight in all) went back to the apartment, knocked and identified
themselves. An agent at the back door heard a voice and an agent at the side saw a hand at
the window near the door. Kinney opened the front door and then tried to close it but
agents pulled him outside onto the porch where the arrest took place. Agents then entered
the apartment and conducted a protective sweep. Writing for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Jones
stated that the sweep was unlawful because the officers had no objective facts to support a
reasonable fear for their safety. Although Kinney was known to associate with others who
had committed violent crimes, police knew that Kinney had not actually committed the
armed robbery. In addition, the police had interviewed Kinney and his associates at which
times no violence had ever been directed against the officers. Chief Judge Edwards con-
curred in part, stating that the protective sweep portion of the discussion was dicta and that
he would take no position on it. Id. at 945 (Edwards, J., concurring).
Judge Kennedy, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would have upheld the sweep
because Kinney had a history of violent crime, the crime in question was armed robbery
(though the actual "in bank" portion of the robbery was not done by him), and Kinney had
a history of associating with violent people. Judge Kennedy characterized the sweep as a
"slight" intrusion only and cited Terry and Chimel in support of the proposition that such
"slight" intrusions were constitutional. Id at 945-46 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
Judge Jones argued, in a footnote, that both cases were narrower than the facts in Kinney
and that reliance on these cases was misplaced. Id at 944 n.2.
Kinney is noteworthy because the focus was not only on the sweep but on the entry as
well. Judge Jones noted that mere movement is likely in any occupied home and is not
indicative of any threat to the officers. Although a crowd was gathering to watch the activ-
ity, it was not hostile. "An opposite holding would permit government agents to infer dan-
ger from any occupied dwelling." Id at 944. Judge Jones specifically noted that officers
could and should have removed Kinney from the area rather than entering the house:
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The totality of circumstances approach supplies the police with no clear
standard. Further, the wide disparity in the depth and level of analysis
foreseeably leaves officers uncertain as to the relevant issues to be weighed.
Is knowledge of the presence of others sufficient to permit a sweep? Is lack
of knowledge about who is in the house or defendant's history of associat-
ing with others sufficient? If evidence of dangerousness is required, can
this be supplied by general things such as the type of crime or prior vio-
lence in an unrelated crime, or the use of weapons to commit crimes? Or
must police have specific knowledge of a likely dangerousness of others in
the arrest situation?
No single uniform answer emerges from these cases. Without better gui-
dance, it is probable that police will continue to conduct sweeps because
they will not know when they should not.
As disturbing as this characteristic . . is when viewed alone, it
becomes even more disturbing when viewed in conjunction with
the tendency of these courts to mask the fact that they have coun-
tenanced protective sweep searches on so scant a showing or jus-
tification by employing a totality of the circumstances approach.
Moreover, the courts have included in the litany of justifying cir-
cumstances ones which bear no relevance to a reasoned appraisal
of the constitutional necessity of such a search. 70
The totality of circumstances approach is unsatisfactory. Its application
has caused a wide disparity of results because the type and level of analysis
is inconsistent, and because the approach does not provide adequate gui-
dance to police officers. Therefore, a case-by-case approach based on a
particular standard should be considered.
C The Search for a Standard
Two obvious standards that have proved attractive to some courts, are
the "reasonable suspicion" standard and the "probable cause" standard.
A number of courts have explicitly analyzed the sweep issue in one or
another of these terms. 7'
"[L]eaving promptly with the defendant would have been the prudent action to take." Id
at 945. Although Kinney was not completely dressed, he did not desire to go back inside the
house to obtain more clothes.
170. Kelder & Statman. The Protective Sweep Doctrine- Recurrent Questions Regarding
the Propriety of Searches Conducted Contemporaneously With an Arrest on or Near Private
Premises, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 973, 1016 (1979).
171. Some of the cases discussed under the totality of circumstances approach can be
characterized as cases in which reasonable suspicion or probable cause was present. In this
section, however, the focus is on those cases explicitly adopting a more general standard
against which to measure the facts in the particular case.
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An example of the "reasonable suspicion" standard is the well known
Supreme Court case of Terry v. Ohio.'72 Terry involved a police officer's
observations of two men repeatedly examining a store window, conferring
together, and reexamining the window.' 7 3 Believing that an armed rob-
bery was imminent, the officer seized Terry for a brief interrogation and
frisk for weapons.'
74
The Court explained that the balance between the need to search and
the right of the individual to be free from governmental intrusion is the
basis of the fourth amendment reasonableness standard.
175
And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to-
gether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably war-
rant that intrusion. The scheme of the fourth amendment
becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point
the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be sub-
jected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in
light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assess-
ment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment
of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate.'
76
As to the frisk of Terry, the Court noted that "it would be unreasonable
to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of
their duties." 177 According to the Court, the question was whether the "of-
ficer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior
he is investigating . . . is armed and presently dangerous."'' 78 It was rea-
sonable to suspect that Terry and his companion were planning a daylight
robbery and that most such crimes are committed while armed. Where
armed men are intercepted before they are about to commit a violent
crime, the potential for violence is obvious. Thus, the frisk was upheld.
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, expressed the belief that special
facts need not exist to justify the frisk, that such protective measures
should be permitted on a per se basis whenever there are grounds to seize
the person. In fact, Harlan believed this was implicit from the majority
172. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
173. Id at 6.
174. Id at 6-7.
175. Id at 21.
176. Id (footnotes omitted).
177. Id at 23.
178. Id. at 24.
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opinion. 179
Terry itself neither upholds nor forecloses the protective sweep issue
under consideration here. Some parallels, though, are apparent. In each,
there is a prior valid seizure of the person and less than a full search car-
ried on for the protection of the officers. Yet, there are differences. In
Terry, the prior seizure was a warrantless street encounter on less than
probable cause while in the typical sweep situation there is a prior arrest
based, in most cases, upon a warrant. Yet, if the legitimate authorized ini-
tial seizure is more extensive in the arrest and sweep situation, so is the
subsequent warrantless search. A Terry stop situation is confined to the
detainee's person and then only to a frisk of the outer clothing. In a sweep
situation, the search is of a home or other premises, but less than a full
search. The entry into various rooms of the house and the examination of
those areas make the analogy between a Terry frisk and a protective sweep
less than totally satisfying.
Some cases seem to suggest that the analogy to Terry is not entirely mis-
placed. In United States v. Wiga ,180 FBI agents were informed that Wiga,
who was wanted for parole violation, would be in the company of a person
named Moody and that Moody would be visiting a particular bank. Police
picked up Moody's trail and followed her to a motor home pulled by a car.
The driver of the car appeared to be Wiga. Police pulled the motor home
and car over to the side of the road. Wiga was arrested but denied that
anyone was in the motor home. The motor home's license indicated that it
was owned by a handicapped person; neither Wiga nor Moody were hand-
icapped. The officers called for Moody to come out of the motor home,
and she did. An officer then entered the motor home and conducted a
protective sweep which produced a weapon.' 8'
The court quoted extensively from its earlier case of United States v.
Gardner,'82 and particularly noted the analogy to Terry v. Ohio .183 In up-
holding the sweep, the Ninth Circuit in Wiga focused on several factors
179. I would affirm this conviction for what I believe to be the same reasons the
Court relies on. I would, however, make explicit what I think is implicit in the
affirmance. . . . Once that forced encounter was justified, however, the officer's
right to take suitable measures for his own safety followed automatically.
Id at 33-34. (Harlan, J., concurring).
180. 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982).
181. Id at 1328. The court rejected the notion that the automobile exception could ap-
ply to a motor home. Id at 1329.
182. 627 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1980).
183. 662 F.2d at 1330. The court noted that although many circuits have upheld the
protective sweep notion in one form or another, the standard and requirements necessary
vary widely from one jurisdiction to another.
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which, taken together, amounted to little. The court noted that police did
not know whether anyone else was in the motor home and that Wiga had
lied about Moody's presence. The handicapped license plate suggested
that someone else would, at some time, be present. 8 4 Yet, none of these
factors seem to rise above a bare fear that a person could be there and
nothing suggests that such hypothesized persons would pose any danger to
the officers. On the basis of this scanty fare, the court upheld not only the
protective sweep but also the entry into the motor home. As a totality of
circumstances case, it is weak at best. As a case based on the Terry stan-
dard, it seems to fall well short of the "objective and articulable" facts
required by that case.
In Wiga, the Ninth Circuit relied upon its earlier decision of United
States v. Gardner.'85 In Gardner, DEA agents set up a drug "buy" and
kept the house in which it was to take place under surveillance, although
one entrance could not be observed by the agents on watch. Three agents
went into the house to complete the "buy." When a dispute arose about
the sale, one of the sellers left through the exit not under surveillance. He
was not seen by the agents until he was somewhere down the block.
Meanwhile, one of the agents inside the house convinced the sellers to let
him walk through the house to assure himself that he was not being set up
to be robbed by the sellers. During the walk-through, the agent saw con-
traband but no other persons.
Eventually, Gardner left to get the drugs. The agents remained in the
house for some time but went out to the front porch just before Gardner
returned. When Gardner came back, the group went back into the house.
Gardner and one agent then walked outside to an undercover patrol car
where Gardner was arrested. Another seller was arrested inside the house
at the same time. Another agent entered the house and conducted a pro-
tective sweep through the rooms and closets. Various items in plain view
were seized as evidence.' 86
The Ninth Circuit upheld the protective sweep on a Terry standard.1 8
7
The court quoted the passage from Terry requiring that the conduct be
reasonably based upon "specific and articulable facts." '188
The question must be asked whether the court actually possessed the
necessary facts to uphold the search on a Terry standard. Although weap-
184. Id. at 1331.
185. 627 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1980).
186. Id. at 908-09.
187. The court cited with approval, Kelder & Statman, supra note 170, as favoring the
Terry standard. 627 F.2d at 910 n.3.
188. 627 F.2d at 910.
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ons had been seen in the house during the agent's walk-through while pos-
ing as a buyer, nothing was seen which would indicate the likelihood of
violence by those involved in the drug deal. 8 9 More telling is the fact that
the agents were reasonably certain that no other persons were in the house.
Although there was one entrance outside the officers' view, nothing oc-
curred indicating it had been used. To enter without being seen would
have required someone to climb the backyard fence and proceed through
the undergrowth.' 90 It seems that whatever standard the court purported
to use, the protective sweep in Gardner was actually upheld on skimpy
facts amounting to no more than a bare "possibility" that someone might
be present and a "possibility" that such a person, if present, might be dan-
gerous. Only in cases dealing with protective sweeps will such a lack of
information pass muster under Terry.'9'
Another standard that courts might apply to the protective sweep is
"probable cause."' 92 Only a few cases have done so explicitly. In United
189. In fact, the court stated that the presence of the weapons in the house created a
"potential for violence." Absent some reason to think that others are present and violence
prone, this seems to be an overstatement. Id at 911.
190. Id
191. In a footnote the court also stated "we do not think it is a controlling fact that
Gardner was arrested just outside his premises wile his codefendant was arrested inside,
instead of Gardner and his confederate both being arrested inside . . .Gardner's resi-
dence." Id. at 910 n.2. The court recognized that:
the extensive surveillance of Gardner's residence and the relatively brief period of
time when both officers were outside of the residence diminish the strength of the
officers' reasonable apprehension concerning the unknown, possibly dangerous, oc-
cupants. The facts in this case are not as compelling as those in some prior cases
where protective searches have been upheld.
Id. at 911.
192. There are two ways to administer such a standard. The first would be to declare
protective sweeps to be warrant exceptions as a group and use the probable cause standard
purely for judging the reasonableness of the search. In essence, this approach treats the
protective sweep as one of the narrowly crafted exceptions to the warrant requirement, while
requiring a high level of knowledge of probable danger before invoking it. Thus, the prob-
able cause approach is more analogous to the stop and frisk approach approved in Terry or
the search incident to a lawful arrest approved in Chimel (although without the per se ele-
ment of the latter as approved in Robinson). The other approach would be to deny to pro-
tective sweeps the status of warrant exception. Not only would probable cause be required
to conduct a protective sweep, but a search warrant would be required which could be dis-
pensed with only if exigent circumstances were present. Not only would a high level of
knowledge be required, but a search warrant would be required unless the reasons for mak-
ing the sweep did not become apparent until the arrival of the arresting officers. Factors
often used to justify sweeps, such as type of crime or defendant's past history of violence, are
clearly not exigent and would not forgive the lack of a search warrant. Courts adopting a
probable cause standard seem to assume that protective sweeps are exceptions to the warrant
requirement.
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States v. Cravero,193 police went to the home of one Cook after seeing
Chandler and Cravero, two persons for whom there were outstanding ar-
rest warrants, go there. Police also had a warrant for one Troise. Agents
entered the home to execute the warrants. After arresting Chandler and
Cravero, and with Cook in view, noises were heard in a bathroom. The
agents entered the bathroom and found one Willets and saw material they
believed to be cocaine and other items used in drug processing. These
items were seized.1 94
The Fifth Circuit upheld the entry into the bathroom on a standard of
probable cause.9' The court stated that "[tihis circuit has recognized such
an exception in a housewide search after a proper arrest for the purpose of
making a cursory safety check when 'the circumstances [provide], at least,
probable cause to believe that [there is] a serious threat to [officer]
safety.' "196
The probable cause standard is a very high one. In finding that there
was probable cause, the court listed, without discussion, four factors. First,
the arrest was made in the early morning hours, but this seems irrelevant
to the issue of danger. Second, the court referred to the "heinous nature of
the crimes."' 197 Third, the court noted that when Chandler was arrested,
he was standing near a pistol which police confiscated. 9 Finally, the
court found that the noises in the bathroom gave police probable cause to
believe that someone was in the bathroom. However, there was little to
suggest that the person in the bathroom would be violent toward the ar-
resting officers on that occasion.
Assuming danger based on the type of crime is speculative at best. The
only gun seen by the police was under their control. The facts appear to be
too weak to support the probable cause standard that the court purports to
follow. Although understandably sympathetic of the desire to assure the
officer's safety, it is unfortunate that the court felt compelled to require
such a high standard against which to measure the conduct of the officers.
The result is a lessening of the meaning of the probable cause standard.
Having been bound by this standard, the court was faced either with de-
193. 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
194. Id at 412-13.
195. The court declined to consider whether the entry could be upheld due to the as-
serted belief of the police that Troise was in the house. "We need not consider their belief in
Troise's presence, because their bathroom entry can survive as a protective sweep to avoid
threats from unknown persons." Id at 417 (footnote omitted).
196. Id at 418 (quoting United States v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1975)).
197. These charges apparently included murder, although they were not detailed in the
opinion. See United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1163 (5th Cir. 1977).
198. Cravero, 545 F.2d at 413.
[Vol. 33:95
Protective Sweep Doctrine
claring unconstitutional a protective sweep conducted with some justifica-
tion by the officers involved, or with bending and weakening the probable
cause standard by applying it to a weak set of facts. It appears that the
latter course was followed.
The earlier case of United States v. Smith,199 relied upon in Cravero,
involved the arrest of Smith at his mobile home.2°° FBI agents obtained
information that Smith and another person were together there and that
Smith was armed. Armed with an arrest warrant, the agents surrounded
the trailer, watching all exits from behind their cars, and used a bull horn
to order Smith out. As Smith exited from the back door, agents kicked in
the front door, found Smith's brother, and conducted a protective
sweep.2 o l
The court upheld the action due to the "high potentiality for danger
surrounding the arrest . . ".., Further, the Fifth Circuit stated that
there was "at the least, probable cause to believe that serious threat to
safety was presented."2 3 In one of those incongruous juxtapositions so
typical of the protective sweep cases, the court stated that "[tihis court will
strictly scrutinize such alleged precautionary searches to insure that there
exists a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger.' ' 2°  The court
then declared that the criteria had been met on the facts of the case and
subsequently upheld both the entry into the mobile home and the protec-
tive sweep without any further discussion.2 °5
Without discussion, it is difficult to determine why the court thought
that there was probable cause to sweep the premises. From the facts of the
case, it is known that Smith was believed to be in the company of an
armed companion. That alone, however, does not amount to probable
cause. 21 Police had the mobile home surrounded and Smith came out
without resistance. In light of this, probable cause seems to be lacking. It
must also be noted that the court, in its brief opinion, upheld not only the
sweep, but an entry into the mobile home without any appreciable distinc-
199. 515 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
200. The warrant was for a violation of the Dyer Act. The charge was severed before
trial and the appeal at issue here involved other charges. Id at 1029-30.
201. Id at 1031.
202. Id
203. Id. (emphasis added). The court also stated that circumstances constituting prob-
able cause existed to uphold the protective sweep in United States v. Looney, 481 F.2d 31
(5th Cir. 1973). See supra the discussion of Looney in text accompanying notes 84-88.
204. Smith, 515 F.2d at 1031 (emphasis added).
205. Id
206. This same factor was used to uphold a protective sweep in United States v. Sellers,
520 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 961, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 955 (1976), on
remand modified on other grounds, 547 F.2d 785 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
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tion. No suggestion was offered as to why the agents could not have pro-
tected themselves by withdrawing from the scene with their prisoner.20 7
Interestingly, another protective sweep case decided by the Fifth Circuit
involved an associate of Cravero's. 2°8 Five months after the arrest of
Cravero, the government obtained revocation of the appeal bond of one
Bowdach, who had previously been convicted of "extortionate extensions
of credit."2 9 An arrest warrant was then issued. The information known
to police suggested that Bowdach was a professional killer and possessed a
collection of weapons.21
A surveillance team of six-plus agents waited for Bowdach. Bowdach
became aware of the activity and actually called local police, telling them
that there were armed men at his home and that he needed assistance. A
local police officer entered the house and subsequently exited the home
with Bowdach. The agents then arrested Bowdach. Shouts came from the
back of the house, "[L]ook out-they have a shotgun" and, later, "[1]ook
out, there are shadows in the house." 211
Against the wishes of Mrs. Bowdach, the agents entered the house
armed with the belief that two others for whom they had warrants were
there. A protective sweep was instituted (as well as a search for the two
others) and a shotgun and other items were seized.
The court upheld the sweep, stating that "[t]he law in this circuit holds
that police officers have a right to conduct a quick and cursory check of a
residence when they have reasonable grounds to believe that there are
207. In Sellers, id, agents arrested defendant outside his apartment on unlawful flight
charges. There was also reason to believe that he was involved in bank robberies and that
he was "travelling" with armed accomplices. Id at 1283. The officers entered the apartment
to find those persons and saw items that they included in a later application for a search
warrant. Defendant attempted to strike down the search warrant by attacking the affidavit
on which it was issued. Defendant argued that the entry and search following the arrest was
conducted in violation of the fourth amendment. Id at 1283.
Apparently, the entry was made because defendant was believed to be travelling with
armed associates. The agents said they feared that such persons might fire on the officers.
The court upheld the sweep on this basis, holding that the officers had "reasonable grounds"
to believe that defendant "was travelling with armed associates." Id at 1284.
If the court is using the term "reasonable grounds" to mean "probable cause" the result is
impossible to justify. Even if probable cause exists to believe that defendant was in the
company of armed persons, it does not necessarily follow that those persons were likely to
attack the officers. Even under a general reasonableness standard, however, the case seems
very weak. In fact, defendant did not resist arrest and his wife and children were standing in
the doorway. None of this gives "reasonable grounds" to fear that the officers were in dan-
ger. If they were, it seems they could easily have left the area.
208. United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977).
209. Id. at 1163.
210. Id.
211. Id at 1165.
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other persons present inside the residence who might present a security
risk." '212 Apparently the court used the term "reasonable grounds" as a
synonym for probable cause. The court upheld the search as a protective
sweep because the defendant was a member of a narcotics ring, the leader
of which was later convicted of murder. The court quoted a conclusory
passage from the district court opinion which stated that the officers' fear
was reasonable, based on their belief that other individuals remained in-
side.2" 3 It is questionable whether such a cursory recitation of the key
facts would be tolerated in a case where the probable cause issue did not
relate to the protective sweep.
McGeehan v. Wainwright,214 a denial of a habeas corpus appeal, in-
volved the commission of an armed robbery by two men who were aided
by a female companion prior to the actual robbery. Officers traced a car
they believed had been used in the robbery to a trailer park. As they ap-
proached the suspect's trailer the lights were extinguished. Movement
could be heard inside. After calling for those inside to exit, a woman came
out. After repeated requests, three more people exited the trailer. Three of
them matched the descriptions of the robbers and their companion, ob-
tained from witnesses at the scene of the robbery. Two officers then en-
tered the trailer and conducted a protective sweep. A weapon was
discovered and confiscated. It was eventually admitted into evidence.21 5
Based on the decisions in United States v. Smith and a factually distin-
guishable case, Hopkins v. Alabama,2"6 in which officers were actually fired
212. Id at 1168 (emphasis added). "This is true whether the initial arrest of defendant
was made inside or outside the residence." Id. It is not unusual to find that once a court
finds probable cause to believe others are in the house, no further inquiry is made into the
probability of such persons attacking the officers. Under any of the standards, many courts
do not engage in the two-pronged inquiry, but rather presume dangerousness merely from
the presence of others besides the arrestee.
213. Id at 1169.
214. 526 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
215. Id at 399-400.
216. 524 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1975). Officers went to defendants' home to investigate a
robbery. When the officers knocked on the door there was gunfire from inside the house.
Tear gas was used to flush out Hopkins (others had exited earlier) but the weapon used to
fire the shots was not found. Officers entered and searched the house. The court upheld the
validity of the search, although it remanded the case on other grounds. The court, in its per
curiam opinion, noted that the danger to the officers from some persons inside the house was
clear from the gunfire and that officers did not know whether the person(s) who had fired on
them were in the house. It should be noted that since firing at officers is a crime, the police
had probable cause to believe that some or all of those in the house had just committed a
crime. Hence, the police were faced with the exigency of the gunfire and the entry in this
case was justified. The issues and facts are rather different than in the average protective
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upon, the sweep was upheld. The court, in its per curiam opinion, noted
the following factors which justified the sweep:
An armed robbery had occurred only about an hour earlier; it
was night-time; the trailer was dark; three of those who exited fit
the descriptions furnished to the officers, as did the automobile
parked by the door; none of the suspects surrendered a weapon.
The officers knew that a shotgun had been used in the robbery,
and they concluded that additional confederates might be con-
cealed inside the darkened trailer with the missing shotgun. As
we held in Smith, "the circumstances provided at least, probable
cause to believe that a serious threat to safety was presented." '17
A focused examination of the factors upon which the court constructed
its lattice work of probable cause forces the analysis to collapse. Some of
the factors listed merely indicated that police had the right location. The
car matched descriptions given by the witnesses, as did some of those per-
sons arrested. Other factors are irrelevant to the issue of potential danger.
It was nighttime and the trailer was dark. In fact, three persons seemed to
have been involved in the robbery, and from the descriptions, it seemed
that all three were in police custody.1 8 Thus, there was little, if any, rea-
sweep case and clearly distinguishable from the facts in cases where no actual violence was
directed at the officers.
Other cases similarly involved entries after shootouts. Unied States v. James, 528 F.2d
999 (5th Cir. 1976), involved the attempt by officers to execute arrest warrants on members
of the Republic of New Africa, a group which claimed the status of an independent nation.
The headquarters of the group resembled an armed fortress and the residents were known to
engage in training to repel potential intruders. When agents attempted to execute the war-
rants, a shootout ensued that involved the use of automatic and other weapons by those
inside and the use of tear gas and various weapons by police and FBI agents outside. Dur-
ing the fight, one officer was killed and two others were wounded by gunfire. Eventually
seven persons came out of the house and surrendered. Agents entered and searched the
house to discover if there were persons for whom warrants were outstanding, to see whether
anyone was hurt, and for protective reasons. Understandably, the protective sweep was up-
held.
United States v. Young, 553 F.2d 1132 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977), also
involved a shootout. After a bank robbery conducted by at least three persons, defendant
engaged in a shootout with police before surrendering. Police called upon any others in the
house to surrender, fired tear gas into the house, entered, and conducted a protective sweep.
It seems that defendant conceded the right of the officers to enter and conduct a protective
sweep. See id at 1134. Although it will not be true in all cases, it is generally true that
following a shootout, where police have reason to believe that others who may have taken
part in it remain in the house, probable cause and exigent circumstances exist which justify
an entry and protective sweep of the premises.
217. McGeehan, 526 F.2d at 399 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
218. Id The court found it significant that the weapon had not been surrendered by
those persons, yet it surely would have been foolhardy for any of those inside to exit the
trailer carrying a shotgun. With all three in custody there was nothing to indicate a danger
that anyone was likely to use the weapon against the officers.
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son to fear an attack by the criminals. Furthermore, there was no objective
evidence indicating that someone else was in the mobile home. Certainly,
there was no probable cause. With all three suspects under arrest, the
police should have left the area, thus assuring their safety from any hy-
pothesized danger.219
219. In contrast, police in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon may, of course, follow him into a
home or other structure without a warrant in order to effect the capture. Obviously, upon
entering the structure, officers can searchfor the object of their chase. Thus far, no issue of
protective sweep is involved. If police may search further or after the arrestee is found,
however, a protective sweep may have taken place. To the extent that courts permit far
reaching searches for the arrestee without closely analyzing the time frame or extent of the
searches, protective sweeps may be upheld sub silentlo.
In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Supreme Court's "hot pursuit" case, police
were called immediately after the armed robbery of a cab company. Following directions
supplied by cab drivers who were on the trail of the robber, police arrived within minutes at
the house into which defendant had run. Officers knocked, a woman answered the door and
police entered. Officers fanned out through the house. Hayden was found in an upstairs
bedroom pretending to be asleep. Other officers on the first floor and in the cellar reported
that no one else was in the house and Hayden was arrested. Noise of water running in a
bathroom next to the upstairs bedroom led to the recovery of a shotgun and pistol in the
toilet tank. An officer in the cellar found various items of evidence in a washing machine.
Id at 297-98.
The Court upheld the search stating that it was for the fleeing felon, but in doing so,
appeared to uphold a search for weapons throughout the house as well:
They [police] acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search
for a man of the description they had been given andfor weapons which he had
used in the robbery or might use against them. The Fourth Amendment does not
require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would
gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.
Id at 298-99 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that a search was the only way to
ensure "that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had control of all weap-
ons which could be used against them or to effect an escape." Id at 299.
This broad language would seem to uphold the concept of protective sweeps at least in the
hot pursuit situation. Although it could be argued that the dangers faced in any arrest situa-
tion are not significantly different than that of a hot pursuit, this is not strictly true. In the
hot pursuit situations, the felon himself is at large (at least until found and arrested), while
in the more usual arrest situation the object of the arrest is known and in custody and possi-
ble danger from other persons is, therefore, the sole concern.
In hot pursuit cases the search is a mixed one, partly for the arrestee and partly for officer
protection from others. Thus, perhaps a search for weapons can be justified in a hot pursuit
case whereas such a search would not be permitted incident to a lawful arrest even if protec-
tive sweeps for people were authorized.
Although the skimpy analysis in the Hayden case makes it less than a satisfactory basis for
the protective sweep doctrine, it suggests the Supreme Court's high concern with officer
safety in arrest situations. A number of appellate court opinions have also upheld protective
sweeps in hot pursuit situations.
For example, in United States v. Peterson, 522 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1975), police on rou-
tine patrol spotted two men, one of whom had a shotgun and the other appeared to be
holding a rifle. The two spotted the police, fired on them, and fled in a car. The officers plus
others gave chase. The car eventually stopped and the men fled. One was arrested on a
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III. DISCUSSION AND PROPOSALS
It was stated earlier that as a general principle, a case-by-case approach,
either based upon the totality of circumstances or measured against a stan-
dard such as probable cause, is preferable to a per se rule. The case-by-
case approach is more responsive to fourth amendment values of privacy
and freedom from governmental intrusion. In simple language, this means
that some searches or seizures that would be permitted under a per se rule
would not be permitted under a case-by-case approach.
Although this thesis has surface appeal, the recounting of the cases using
a case-by-case approach suggests that this approach has not resulted in a
significantly lesser degree of intrusion than would a per se rule. It is true,
of course, that some courts have struck down some protective sweeps. Yet,
many of these cases involved searches that went beyond what would prob-
ably be authorized by a reasonably restrictive per se rule (for example, an
entry after the arrest is completed outside or moving bags in the attic) and,
therefore, would be struck down under either approach. Furthermore,
many courts have upheld, on a case-by-case basis, searches that would not
be permitted under a per se rule. This suggests that a per se rule may
sometimes be more protective of fourth amendment values than a case-by-
case approach.
Why have courts been overly expansive in their treatment of protective
sweeps? Although no absolutely precise answer is possible because one
cannot see into the minds of the deciding judges, some ideas can be sug-
gested. In reading the protective sweep cases, it is apparent that the courts
are responsive to actions taken by officers for their own protection. There
appears to be a basic sense on the part of most judges that police in poten-
tially dangerous encounters should be able to take steps to protect their
safety. Thus, there is a tendency on the part of many courts to uphold
protective sweeps because the basic reason for the sweeps is considered
sound. Under a case-by-case approach there is minimal guidance given to
lawn and the other was pursued into a house where one officer believed he had seen a man
with a rifle. The man was discovered and arrested, but police were concerned for their
safety and conducted a protective sweep. Various items were discovered in plain view and
seized. The court upheld the sweep. "The clearly emergent circumstances following the
shootout all combined to justify the exercise of reasonable and proper precautions by the
police for their own protection." Id at 665. The court cited Hayden without stopping to
note the factual difference that in Peterson the defendant seemed to have been arrested prior
to the sweep, or the sweep continued after the defendant was known to be in custody, while
in Hayden it appears that the search for the felon and the security sweep were conducted
simultaneously. For additional cases upholding protective sweeps in hot pursuit situations,
see United States v. Miller, 449 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Blalock, 578 F.2d
245 (9th Cir. 1978).
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officers in the field as to what should and should not be done. Given this
lack of guidance, it is not unusual to find officers conducting sweeps too
often and too extensively. The natural nervousness of the agents, coupled
with the ad hoc case-by-case approach to the problem, makes this result
inevitable. Courts are faced with these sweeps only after they are com-
pleted. The particular sweep can be struck down, but, often, the courts
uphold protective sweeps. Apparently, the courts understand and sympa-
thize with the fact that agents have little guidance in deciding whether or
not to conduct a sweep.22° In upholding the sweeps, however, the courts
have blurred or minimized their analysis of the issues or have twisted and
debased traditional fourth amendment concepts.
A similar debasement is less likely to occur in other fourth amendment
areas because courts are less sympathetic to interests of evidence gathering
or crime detection than they are to the basic safety of those involved in
police work. Courts may scrutinize more closely a search conducted for a
reason other than the safety of officers.22" '
It is suggested that a narrowly crafted per se rule is a better approach to
the protective sweep problem than the case-by-case approach. A narrowly
crafted per se rule will give officers clear direction as to what they can and
cannot do to protect themselves from possible attacks by persons other
than the arrestee during a lawful arrest. Many overly expansive sweeps
will not be conducted because the arresting officers will know the limits of
lawful protective sweeps. Furthermore, once the limits of such sweeps are
clear and are known to the officers in advance, courts are likely to be less
sympathetic to sweeps that exceed the limits and, as a result, will be more
likely to strike them down with vigor.
What then is the permissible scope of a protective sweep that should be
authorized on a per se basis incident to a lawful arrest? When the arrest
takes place inside a home, apartment, or other premises, it is reasonable to
briefly enter each room and visually scan it to find otherpersons who could
pose a threat to the officers during the course of the arrest.222 No detached
outbuilding can be swept under this per se rule, although the basement
and/or attic can be swept if accessible at the time of the arrest. No entry
220. In contrast, a few courts have taken an unduly restrictive view toward protective
sweeps, and there are cases in which the rules advanced in these courts, if followed in future
cases, may expose arresting officers to excessive risks.
221. Interestingly, another area in which this author has seen a considerable broadening
and watering down (debasement if you will) of the fourth amendment is in the stop and frisk
cases under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio. Of course, Terry is also a case concerned largely
with issues of officer safety.
222. The sweep is conducted to discover persons, not weapons or evidence.
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into such places should be made if access is available only through an
impermanent means, such as a ladder, unless this means of access is set up,
suggesting that it may have been recently used. The aim is to quickly enter
those parts of the premises that could easily have been reached by persons
in the house during the approach of the arresting officers.2 23
The time allowed for such a sweep is brief. It should include only the
time needed to enter and scan each room for persons. In general, such a
sweep should take only a few minutes, because police are to look only for
other individuals on the premises.
Most cases which have upheld protective sweeps have assumed that
"human sized" containers, such as closets, can be examined as part of a
protective sweep. This, however, is incorrect. It authorizes too broad a
sweep.24 None of the cases examined for this article involved a person
actually found hiding in such an area. Persons were always found sitting
at tables, walking, sitting on steps, or in similar places. Thus, the intrusive-
ness outweighs the need for protection and no closet or container should
be opened during a protective sweep authorized on a per se basis.225
If officers wish to open closets, hampers, trunks or other such areas,
there must be particular reason to do so. In general, a sweep of the prem-
ises as described above should be sufficient to assure the safety of the ar-
resting officers and safety is the sole justification for protective sweeps. If
the sweep authorized by this rule does not lead to a particularized suspi-
cion that someone is in a closet or other container, then the search of that
area is unreasonable.
Thus, it is proposed that a Terry v. Ohio "reasonable suspicion" stan-
223. It would be reasonable to require any such persons found during a protective sweep
to accompany the officer to some central place in the residence where they could be watched
until the arrest is completed and the officers have left the premises. No search of such per-
sons may be conducted under this per se rule, including a frisk for weapons, since the seizure
of these persons is on a per se basis and does not satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard of
Terry Y. Ohio. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
224. If a court does authorize the opening of "human sized" closed containers on a per se
basis, the scope of the permissible sweep is no more than a visual scan of them. Clothes in a
closet do not need to be touched or moved to check for persons, since a check for legs of a
person will serve as well and can be done without such contact. If a hamper is to be
scanned, clothing need not be removed or compressed since it is unlikely that a person in
such an area could completely conceal himself from view. A court permitting intrusion into
closed areas as part of a protective sweep must undertake the responsibility to ensure that a
protective sweep for persons does not slip over the line and become, in reality, a search for
evidence.
225. Although officers might prefer a broader rule, the actual extent of the rule will be
clear and it is supported by the actual dangers or lack thereof seen in the cases to date. It is
suggested that courts will be more willing, therefore, to strike down protective sweeps ex-
ceeding that which is authorized by the per se rule.
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dard be adopted for searches of closets or containers during a protective
sweep. Assume, for example, that movement by a person other than the
arrestee is seen through a window as the arresting officers approach the
house, but the protective sweep fails to turn up the second person. In this
situation it may be reasonable to open closets, etc., but in the normal arrest
situation it would not. It is suggested that substantially fewer intrusions
into such areas will take place under this two step approach. A narrow per
se rule coupled with a requirement for additional particular reasons to
search more fully, will reasonably protect the safety of the arresting
officers.
Some courts have upheld entries into premises to conduct protective
sweeps following an arrest outside. As has been discussed, such a proce-
dure permits not only a sweep, but an entry that could not otherwise be
accomplished once the arrest was made outside. Thus, the level of intru-
sion is much greater than those situations where the entry is separately and
lawfully accomplished and only the sweep itself is at issue.
In general, an entry and sweep following an arrest outside is unreasona-
ble and can never be permitted on a per se basis under the rule advocated
in this article. In addition, due to the high level of the intrusion, even a
reasonable suspicion of danger is not enough to validate the entry. Under
no other circumstances would reasonable suspicion alone validate an entry
and search of a house. The same should be true following an arrest
outside. Officers must have probable cause to believe that persons hostile
to them are in the house. In addition, the government must be prepared to
show why the officers would not have been equally safe or safer had they
merely removed the arrestee from the area. These requirements should
put an end to most such entries.
The rules advocated in this article are not perfect. Some ambiguities
and new questions will arise requiring interpretation and consideration. It
is suggested, however, that the rules proposed here will permit arresting
officers to take reasonable steps to preserve their safety during arrests
while clearly understanding the limits of such steps. The courts, therefore,
will be more willing to strike down violations of the limits through the use
of the exclusionary remedy. The balance struck will better protect impor-
tant fourth amendment values than the current hodgepodge of standards
and decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
After Chime? v. California, protective sweeps were neither foreclosed nor
specifically authorized by the Supreme Court. At all times a protective
1983]
Catholic University Law Review
sweep is a search under the fourth amendment, because it is a significant
intrusion into the reasonable expectation of privacy that an arrestee has in
his home. Nevertheless, the protective sweep is justified by a need to safe-
guard arresting officers from possible attack by persons other than the ar-
restee. This need to sweep, however, must be balanced against the right of
citizens to be secure in their homes from unreasonable governmental intru-
sions. To maintain this balance, the narrowest rule that will reasonably
protect the arresting officers should be adopted.
A case-by-case justification is, as a general rule, preferable to a per se
rule. The case-by-case approach is generally a narrower one and, as a
result, more protective of important fourth amendment interests. In the
case of protective sweeps, however, a case-by-case approach does not work
well. Courts are often unable or unwilling to adopt a clear standard and,
more importantly, when such a standard is adopted, it is not uniformly
applied. Courts are reluctant to strike down protective sweeps because
they recognize the need for them. This has led courts to extend traditional
doctrines, such as probable cause and search incident to arrest, and to up-
hold sweeps in factual situations that do not meet the general standards
adopted by the reviewing courts. Additionally, the case-by-case approach
provides little guidance to arresting officers in determining when a sweep is
authorized. The case law to date is not clear enough to be followed by
officers in the field.
In practice, a tightly crafted, sharply defined, and narrow per se rule
might provide more protection to fourth amendment values than the case-
by-case approach. Under this rule, the protection of arresting officers ap-
pears to justify a protective sweep of the premises whenever the arresting
officers do not know for a fact that no persons other than the arrestee are
on the premises. Although a brief detention of persons found on the prem-
ises as a result of a protective sweep is authorized, no search of such per-
sons, including a frisk, is permitted under the per se rule. A protective
sweep would be limited to a walk-through of the premises and a brief vis-
ual scan of each room.
As guidance to officers, the rule should limit the amount of time allowed
for a protective sweep. It should not exceed the time it takes to walk to
each room and the 5-10 seconds that might be needed in each room to scan
for persons. Protective sweeps are not conducted for the purpose of dis-
covering contraband or evidence of a crime. The opening of any area
within a room, including "walk-in" closets, is not routinely authorized
under this per se rule. In the bulk of cases, sufficient protection is provided
by permitting the walk-through. Further search must be justified by rea-
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sonable suspicion to believe that others are present and that their inten-
tions may be hostile. Thus, if a second person is spotted through a window
as officers approach, failure to find such a person during the protective
sweep may be sufficient to authorize the opening of closets or other
"human sized" areas to locate the individual.
When an arrest is conducted outside the premises, there is no per se right
to enter the premises to conduct a protective sweep. Such an action is
never authorized by the rule advocated in this article. An entry after an
arrest outside can only be justified based on probable cause and exigent
circumstances. In addition, the government bears a heavy burden to show
why the officers' safety could not be protected by simply leaving the area
with the arrestee. A narrowly defined per se rule, therefore, preserves the
fourth amendment right to be secure from governmental intrusion, and
simultaneously protects the safety of the arresting officers.

